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INTRODUCTION
March 4, 1996, was a cold, blustery day in New York City. Andrew
"Andy" Klein, president and founder of Spring Street Brewing Company,
Inc., was happy to trade the cold outside for the warmth afforded by his
Greenwich Village office. Little did he know, however, exactly how warm
his day would become, for this was Klein's day to be on the hot seat.
With no forewarning, the call came at about 11:00 a.m. Klein's secre-
tary simply informed him that someone was on hold. With a cup of coffee
in one hand, Klein casually picked up the handset with his other and of-
fered his usual salutation: "Hello, Andy here." Much to Klein's surprise, a
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staff attorney of the Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC") greeted
him. He asked Klein to make himself available for a conference call later
that day.
When the second call finally arrived, Klein found himself on the re-
ceiving end of a conference call with twelve high-ranking SEC staff mem-
bers, most of whom were attorneys. They had a few questions for Klein
about Spring Street's activities on the Internet-a few very tough ques-
tions. Klein nervously called to his secretary to hold his calls. He antici-
pated this one would take a while.
I
The SEC inquired about Spring Street's bulletin board trading system
("BBTS") for its common stock. Spring Street's was the world's first
BBTS established on the Internet's World Wide Web (the "Web").2
Known as "Wit-Trade" and named after the company's trademark Wit
Beer product, the BBTS was designed to provide Spring Street's common
stockholders with a mechanism for selling their otherwise illiquid shares.
3
These stockholders and other interested parties could access the BBTS
through the home page4 of the Web site5 established by Spring Street.
6
Klein had established Wit-Trade on March 1, 1996. The SEC's call came
three days later. Only the weekend was sandwiched in between.
1. These facts were provided to the author by Andy Klein. See also Andrew Klein, Wall-
Street.com: How the Beer Company That Created the First Internet IPO Is Shaking Up the Stock Mar-
ket, WIRED, Feb. 1998, at 88, 92.
2. As explained by Joseph Cella and John Stark:
The [World Wide Web or] Web is a hypertext based information and resource system for the
Internet and, as the fastest growing part of the Internet, it is most likely responsible for the
amazing interest in the Internet itself. Each screenful of information includes menu choices
and highlighted words through which the user can call up further information, either from
the same computer or by linking automatically to another computer anywhere in the world.
Joseph J. Celia III & John R. Stark, SEC Enforcement and the Internet: Meeting the Challenge of the
Next Millennium-A Programfor the Eagle and the Internet, 52 BUS. LAW. 815, 821 (1997) (citations
omitted). Celia and Stark further describe a "hyperlink" as an electronic code "embedded in a Web
page [that] enables a user to jump from one piece of information to a related item no matter where on
the Internet the information may be stored." Id. at 821 n.34 (citation omitted).
3. See infra text accompanying notes 134-36.
4. A "home" or "index" page is the initial screen that greets visitors to a particular Web site
and guides them through the information available at the site. See Celia & Stark, supra note 2, at 821
n.33.
5. A "Web site" refers to the space on a computer server that is occupied by the information
maintained by a particular business or individual. That business or individual has the freedom to
change that information as often as necessary in order to keep it current. See id.
6. Spring Street's home page, which no longer contains a hyperlink to its BBTS, was located
at <http:l/plaza.interport.netlwitbeer/withome.html>, which the author last visited March 1, 1998.
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Klein is a man of many firsts-a reluctant cult hero of capitalism.
7
He conducted the world's first initial public offering ("IPO") of common
stock over the Internet to raise capital for his fledgling beer company.
8
The offering generated so much publicity9 that Klein was quickly over-
whelmed with calls from the heads of other small businesses asking for
advice on how to raise money over the Internet. In Klein's mind, these
calls had "opportunity" written all over them. He seized it by establishing
the world's first Internet investment banking firm, Wit Capital Corporation
("Wit Capital"). 10
Klein is, indeed, a financial revolutionary; he led the way in using the
Internet as a tool to offer and sell securities to the public. Through his
BBTS, he demonstrated how the Internet could be used to provide liquidity
to investors. The SEC, too, has recognized the Internet has a tremendous
potential in the capital markets. While attempting to embrace this new
technology, the SEC has aggressively provided guidance to issuers through
various releases and no-action letters." For this, the SEC should be com-
mended.
7. Cf Deborah Lohse, Wit Capital Will Launch On-Line Site-Founder Says Brokerage Will
Give Public Easy Access to IPOs, WALL ST. J., Sept. 15, 1997, at B121 (reluctantly labeling Klein a
"minor celebrity").
8. See Ronald M. Loeb & David J. Richter, Electronic Offerings: Securities Law in the Age of
the Internet, Advanced Securities Law Workshop, at 319 (PLI Corp. Law & Practice Course Handbook
Series No. B4-7142, 1996). For a description of how an Internet stock offering is conducted, see infra
text accompanying notes 115-41.
9. See, e.g., Udayan Gupta, Microbrewery Uses the Internet to Post Circular on Its IPO,
WALL ST. J., Feb. 24, 1995, at B5; Klein, supra note I, at 90; Lohse, supra note 7; Robert A. Mamis,
Andy Klein: Inc. Talks to Spring Street Brewery's Founder About How He Raised Capital Through
the World Wide Web, INC., July 1996, at 38.
10. See Wit Capital Home Page (visited Mar. 1, 1998) <http://www.witcapital.com>. For a
recent update on Wit Capital, see Peter Truell, Investment Maverick Navigates the Internet, N.Y.
TiMES, Nov. 9, 1998, at CI.
11. See, e.g., Statement of the Commission Regarding Use of Internet Web Sites to Offer Se-
curities, Solicit Securities Transactions or Advertise Investment Services Offshore, Securities Act Re-
lease No. 7516, 63 Fed. Reg. 14,806 (Mar. 23, 1998); Use of Electronic Media by Broker-Dealers,
Transfer Agents and Investment Advisors for Delivery of Information: Additional Examples Under the
Securities Act of 1933, Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Investment Company Act of 1940, Se-
curities Act Release No. 7288, 61 Fed. Reg. 24,644 (May 9, 1996) [hereinafter Use of Electronic Me-
dia by Broker-Dealers Release]; Use of Electronic Media for Delivery Purposes, Securities Act Re-
lease No. 7233, [1995 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 3200, at 3128 (Oct. 6, 1995)
[hereinafter Use of Electronic Media for Delivery Purposes Release]; Lamp Technologies, Inc., SEC
No-Action Letter, 8 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 77,453, at 78,327 (May 29, 1998) (addressing accred-
ited investor access to a password-controlled list of private investment funds exempt from registration
under sections 3(c)(1) and (7) of the Investment Company Act of 1940); Net Roadshow, Inc., SEC
No-Action Letter, 1998 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 107 (Jan. 30, 1998), available in LEXIS, Fedsec Library,
Noact File (discussing on-line roadshows made available to institutional investors); Bloomberg L.P.,
SEC No-Action Letter, 1997 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 1023 (Dec. 1, 1997), available in LEXIS, Fedsec
Library, Noact File (same); Private Financial Network, SEC No-Action Letter, [1997 Transfer Binder]
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There is, however, a dark side to this story that is beginning to reveal
itself to those least capable of protecting themselves. 2 The Internet and
other electronic media have made it possible for "not ready for prime
time" companies to throw the financing roadmap traditionally followed by
growing companies out the window. 13 These financially immature com-
panies now have the means to bypass most private financing sources and
offer their securities directly to the general public without the investor
protections and assistance afforded by underwriters. 14  Companies con-
ducting these offerings rely primarily on one of the small issue public of-
fering ("SIPO") exemptions' 5 to the registration requirements of the Se-
curities Act of 1933 (the "Securities Act").
16
Fed. See. L. Rep. (CCH) 77,332, at 77,675 (Mar. 12, 1997) (addressing video transmission of offer-
ing roadshows); Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co., SEC No-Action Letter, 1997 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 14
(Jan. 6, 1997), available in LEXIS, Fedsec Library, Noact File (addressing listing of company's Web
site address in company prospectus); ITT Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, [1997 Transfer Binder] Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 177,340, at 77,701 (Dec. 6, 1996) (same); Angel Capital Elec. Network, SEC No-
Action Letter, [1997 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 77,304, at 77,515 (Oct. 25, 1996)
(addressing allowing accredited investors to access a password-controlled list of small corporate offer-
ings at ACE-Net's home page); PerfectData Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 1996 SEC No-Act. LEXIS
700 (Aug. 5, 1996), available in LEXIS, Fedsec Library, Noact File (addressing passive bulletin board
trading systems); IPONET, SEC No-Action Letter, [1997 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
77,252, at 77,271 (July 26, 1996) (addressing accredited investors' access to a password-controlled
list of private placements listed on IPONet's Web site); Real Goods Trading Corp., SEC No-Action
Letter, [1997 Tranfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 177,226, at 77,131 (June 24, 1996)
[hereinafter Real Goods No-Action Letter] (addressing passive bulletin board trading system); Spring
Street Brewing Co., SEC No-Action Letter, [1997 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 77,201,
at 77,001 (Apr. 17, 1996) [hereinafter Spring Street No-Action Letter] (same).
12. See Celia & Stark, supra note 2, at 817. Celia and Stark portray this dark side as a den of
thieves prepared to assault unsuspecting travelers of the information superhighway. See infra note
217 and accompanying text.
13. See, e.g., Sana Siwolop, Pouring Itself Into the Stock Market, N.Y. TIhmS, May 25, 1997,
§ 3, at 4 (describing the efforts of a four-year-old company specializing in coffee bars to raise capital
via a self-managed initial pubic offering over the Internet).
14. The offer and sale of securities by an issuer directly to members of the public without the
underwriting assistance of one or more investment banks is referred to throughout this Article as a
"self-managed offering." For general information on self-managed offerings, see Stephen M. Graham,
Self-Managed Public Offerings for Emerging Companies, 43 PRAC. LAW. 75 (1997) (discussing the
savings advantage of self-managed public offerings). See also Steven E. Levingston, Tiny Firms Offer
Stock 'Direct' to Public, WALL ST. J., May 20, 1996, at Cl (discussing the recent rise in self-managed
offerings).
15. As discussed more fully in infra Part I, "small issue" offering exemptions consist of those
exemptions promulgated by the SEC under its authority granted by Congress under section 3(b) of the
Securities Act. See 15 U.S.C. § 77c(b) (1994 & Supp. III 1997). "Small issue public offering" or
"SIPO" exemptions consist of those small issue offering exemptions that allow issuers or persons act-
ing on their behalf to offer or sell securities to the public through general solicitation or advertising
activities. The focal point of this Article is on the SIPO exemptions of Regulation A and Rule 504 of
Regulation D, because they allow issuers to engage in those activities. See 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.251-.263
(1998); id. §§ 230.501-.508.
16. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa.
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These companies directly and purposefully solicit a hungry, untapped
segment of the investor market-so-called "unpreferred retail investors."
These investors consist of members of the general public, many of
whom-in the parlance of the securities laws-are financially unsophisti-
cated, 7 have limited net worths, and are easily and quickly intoxicated by
the aroma of get-rich-quick schemes. Historically denied meaningful par-
ticipation in registered IPOs underwritten by mainstream investment
banks,18 these investors have clamored to get in on ground floor IPO ac-
tion during the unprecedented bull market of the 1990s. 9 While attempts
to include these retail investors in quality IPOs are being made,20 success
is likely to be modest at best.
21
The heightened desire of unpreferred retail investors to participate in
IPOs has coincided with the increased ability of unseasoned businesses to
solicit capital aggressively directly from members of the public22 through
the Internet and other unconventional means.23 Despite suggestions to the
contrary, 24 subjecting these retail investors to the virtually unfiltered "cold
call" solicitations of unseasoned companies is not the solution to their IPO
17. The Securities Act differentiates between sophisticated and unsophisticated investors par-
ticularly in the context of transactions exempt from the registration requirements of section 5. See id.
§ 77e (1994). See also, e.g., SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119, 126 (1953) (limiting the sec-
tion 4(2) private placement exemption to offerings to investors who can "fend for themselves"); 17
C.F.R. § 230.501(a) (defining an "accredited investor" for purposes of Rules 505 and 506 of Regula-
tion D); id. § 230.506(b)(2)(ii) (specifying that "purchasers" must be limited to those nonaccredited
investors having "such knowledge and experience in financial and business matters that [they are]
capable of evaluating the merits and risks of the prospective investment").
18. See infra Part II.B.
19. Netscape Communication's 1994 IPO is a prime example of where ordinary retail investors,
including this author, sought access to IPO shares but were denied. In this same vein, the president of
Fidelity Brokerage Services, Inc., gave the following response in an undated letter sent to retail cus-
tomers who requested information about Fidelity's new liaison with Salomon Smith Bamey Holdings,
Inc.: "Thank you for your recent request for more information about initial public offerings (IPOs) and
secondary offerings available through Fidelity Brokerage. We know that many of you are eager to
have access to these new issue equity securities. Now, as a Fidelity Brokerage customer, you can."
Letter from Robert P. Mazzarella, President of Fidelity Brokerage Services, Inc. (received Aug. 8,
1997) (on file with author). For a discussion of Fidelity's liaison with Salomon, see infra notes 174-
76 and accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 174-78 and accompanying text.
21. See infra Part II.B.
22. See infra text accompanying notes 131-33. This development is dripping with irony.
Traditional underwriters have historically ignored the capital formation needs of unseasoned busi-
nesses on the one hand, and the investment needs of unpreferred retail investors on the other. These
two groups-perennial wallflowers at the public offering dance-can now interact directly without
any matchmaking assistance from traditional underwriters. The question remains, however, as to
whether they will prove to be compatible dance partners. For more on this point, see infra note 27.
23. See infra note 131.
24. See Mamis, supra note 9; Future Directions in Film Financing-the Emerging On-Line
Option (visited Mar. 12, 1998) <http://www.webcinema.org/seminarl.html>.
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access problem. These investors want what all investors want: the finan-
cial wheat, not the chaff. But instead of participating in the offerings of
companies underwritten by investment banks who risk their reputational
capital and are subject to liability under the securities laws, these investors
increasingly are bombarded with a smorgasbord of self-managed offerings
with risk-reward ratios heavily skewed toward risk.
Even assuming that these self-managed SIPOs comply with applica-
ble federal disclosure requirements and survive the scrutiny of state blue
sky regulators, the securities offered thereby are not likely to constitute
suitable investments for many unsophisticated retail investors. Of course,
it is exactly those investors' dearth of financial savvy that makes them the
perfect target for SIPO issuers.25 No doubt many retail investors who can
ill-afford to gamble with their limited savings may be lured into participat-
ing in these offerings with financially disastrous results and little, if any,
effective legal recourse under current law.26 The "learning through suffer-
ing," however, is a highly inappropriate solution to this suitability prob-
lem. 7 Moreover, it could unnecessarily tarnish the Internet's image as an
25. See NASAA Comment Letter to SEC Secretary Jonathan Katz Regarding SEC Release 33-
6924 on Small Business Initiatives, [1986-1993 Transfer Binder] NASAA Rep. (CCH) 9346, at 9374
(July 24, 1992) (noting that businesses engaging in smaller public offerings often sell to less finan-
cially sophisticated investors); Stephen J. Choi, Gatekeepers and the Internet: Rethinking the Regula-
tion of Small Business Capital Formation, 2 J. SMALL & EMERGING BUS. L. 27, 31 (1998) ("Small
companies... present investors with the greatest risk of getting stuck with a lemon.").
26. How many retail investors will this entail? While no definitive answer is available, Profes-
sor Donald Langevoort has made the following point:
No doubt there are some investors willing to "take a flier" simply on the basis of either their
own analysis of the issuer's prospects or an appealing multimedia presentation. The persis-
tence of the more unsavory segment of the penny stock market shows that there is a market
for investors who buy impulsively, even in the absence of solid reputational intermediation.
Donald C. Langevoort, Angels on the Internet. The Elusive Promise of "Technological Disinterme-
diation" for Unregistered Offerings of Securities, 2 J. SMALL & EMERGING Bus. L. 1, 14 (1998)
(citations omitted).
27. Some commentators are skeptical about the efficacy of self-managed offerings and, there-
fore, do not appear overly concerned by this suitability problem. See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., Brave
New World?: The Impact(s) of the Internet on Modem Securities Regulation, 52 BUS. LAW. 1195,
1213 (1997) (stating that "self-distributed equity offerings [may] be so rare, at least at first, that they
will receive special scrutiny by the SEC"); Langevoort, supra note 26, at 26 (arguing that "predictions
of the advent of disintermediation are premature" based on the economic and social role that interme-
diaries play); Jennifer Files, Camelot on the Web, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Apr. 9, 1997, at ID
(noting that although hundreds of companies have tried to raise capital over the Internet in the past
few years, "perhaps 20 have been successful"); Lohse, supra note 7 (discussing how Andy Klein's
cyber efforts have helped "unleash a wave of as-yet-unfulfilled excitement about cyber-deals and cy-
bertrading").
An important distinction, however, must be made. The notion that technology will enable sea-
soned businesses to access the public capital markets without the assistance of traditional financial
intermediaries (so-called "disintermediation") is distinctly different from the notion that technology
will enable unseasoned businesses that could seldom enlist the aid of financial intermediaries in the
19981
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effective medium of capital formation. To prevent this, the SEC should
require unseasoned issuers who conduct self-managed SIPOs to comply
with this Article's proposed suitability standard before selling securities to
unsophisticated retail investors.
Part I of this Article briefly describes how unseasoned companies
now offer their common stock directly to the public via the Internet and
other electronic media. Part I also discusses the renaissance in the use of
Regulation A28 and Rule 504 of Regulation D2 9-- the primary SIPO ex-
emptions relied upon by unseasoned issuers. Part II discusses the investor
protection services that investment banks provide in underwritten regis-
tered offerings that self-managed SIPOs lack. It also discusses the frustra-
tion unpreferred retail investors face when attempting to participate in of-
ferings underwritten by mainstream investment banks. Part III first
addresses the legal concepts of full disclosure, merit review, and suitability
as mechanisms for investor protection. It then examines why suitability
concerns arise in the context of self-managed SIPOs conducted over the
Internet. Part I finishes by demonstrating that the on-line initiatives un-
dertaken by the SEC and various states have failed to address these con-
cerns. Finally, Part IV analyzes the suitability standards employed by the
National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc. ("NASD") and the SEC in
other contexts. It then proposes and explains a new federal suitability
standard for self-managed SIPOs directed at unsophisticated retail inves-
tors.
I. CONDUCTING SMALL ISSUE PUBLIC OFFERINGS
OVER THE INTERNET
The interaction of two complimentary elements-one statutory and
the other technological-provides unseasoned companies with an unprece-
dented opportunity to raise capital directly from the general public without
the aid of underwriters. The first element consists of section 3(b) of the
first place to access the public capital markets directly. This author agrees with Professors Coffee and
Langevoort that disintermediation with respect to the capital-raising efforts of seasoned businesses is
likely to occur in a slow, piecemeal fashion. By contrast, use of the term "disintermediation" with
respect to the public capital-raising efforts of unseasoned businesses is improper, because few of those
businesses have been able to entice financial intermediaries to aid in those efforts in the first place. In
other words, little to no intermediation has occurred in this context to date. Managers of the unsea-
soned businesses with whom this author has interacted already view self-managed SIPOs as a viable
financing alternative. It is, indeed, the ultimate irony that the Internet and other electronic media have
made it possible for unseasoned businesses and unpreferred retail investors-the two groups tradi-
tionally shunned by financial intermediaries-to transact directly with each other. See infra Part II.
28. 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.251-.263 (1998).
29. Id. §§ 230.501-.508.
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Securities Act and the rules and regulations promulgated thereunder by the
SEC. The second element consists of the Internet and related technologies
that bring significant economies of scale to the distribution of information
to thousands of targeted recipients. While the statutory provision and re-
lated rules and regulations have existed in various iterations for decades,
the advent of the Internet has transformed them into incredibly powerful
tools for raising capital in a cost-effective manner.
A. GENERAL SOLICITATION IN A SMALL ISSUE OFFERING CONTEXT
The high cost of registering and offering securities in compliance
with section 5 of the Securities Act30 makes it impractical for most small
business issuers31 seeking to raise a relatively small amount of capital
32
from the public to pursue a full-fledged registered offering.33 Congress
and the SEC recognize this and have provided these issuers with two pri-
mary alternatives. The first alternative is to register securities under sec-
tion 5 but on registration forms more user-friendly to small businesses than
Form S-1, 34 the traditional IPO registration form. These more user-
friendly forms are Forms SB-1 and SB-2,35 whose use has been estimated
to save an issuer up to $125,000 per offering.36 In addition, these forms
allow small business issuers to adhere to the simplified disclosure guide-
30. 15 U.S.C. § 77e (1994).
31. Securities Act Rule 405 defines a "small business issuer" as any U.S. or Canadian issuer
that has revenues and a public float (the value of voting shares in the hands of nonaffiliates) of less
than $25 million and is not an investment company under the Investment Company Act of 1940. See
17 C.F.R. § 230.405.
32. For purposes of this Article, any securities offering of $5 million or less is "small." This
$5 million threshold corresponds to the maximum dollar amount of securities that can be sold in reli-
ance on the exemption provided by section 3(b) of the Securities Act during any 12-month period.
See 15 U.S.C. § 77c(b) (1994 & Supp. III 1997).
33. See THOMAS LEE HAZEN, THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION § 4.13, at 187 (3d ed.
1996); The Impact of the 1992 Small Business Initiatives, 47 ADMIN. L. REV. 511, 512 (1995)
[hereinafter Impact of Small Business Initiatives] ("In fact, the costs and confusion spawned by SEC
regulation may prevent entrepreneurs from exercising the option of a public stock offering.").
34. 17 C.F.R. § 239.11.
35. Id. §§ 239.9-.10. Any small business issuer can use Form SB-i to register up to $10 million
of securities to be sold for cash, so long as that issuer has not registered more than $10 million in any
continuous 12-month period, including the transaction being registered. See id. § 239.9. Form SB-2
can be utilized by any small business issuer to register any dollar amount of securities to be sold for
cash. See id. § 239.10. For a convenient reprint of Forms SB-i and SB-2, see RICHARD W. JENNINGS,
HAROLD MARSH, JR., JOHN C. COFFEE, JR. & JOEL SELIGMAN, FEDERAL SECURITIES LAWS: SELECTED
STATUTES, RULES AND FORMS 436-45 (1997 ed.) [hereinafter JENNINGS ET AL., FEDERAL SECURITIES
LAWS].
36. See Impact of Small Business Initiatives, supra note 33, at 519.
1998]
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lines in Regulation S-B, 37 rather than the more stringent ones in Regulation
S-K.
38
The second alternative for small business issuers is to offer their se-
curities pursuant to one of the "small issue" offering exemptions to regis-
tration. These exemptions were promulgated by the SEC pursuant to
authority granted by Congress under section 3(b) of the Securities Act,
39
and were adopted "in recognition of the economics involved [in small is-
sue offerings] and.., because of the SEC's view that... [those offerings]
do not call for the expansive disclosure required by a full-fledged 1933 Act
registration."40 These exemptions include Regulation A4' and Rule 504 of
Regulation D42 among others.
43
37. 17 C.F.R. § 228.10. Regulation S-B is an "integrated disclosure system" specifically de-
signed for a new class of issuers ("small business issuers") that applies to the annual and quarterly
reports filed by those issuers under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the "Exchange Act"), see 15
U.S.C. §§ 78a-78mm, and the securities offering registration statements filed pursuant to the Securi-
ties Act. See Impact of Small Business Initiatives, supra note 33, at 513 & n.13. Prior to 1992, the
disclosure made by small business issuers was governed by Regulation S-K. See 17 C.F.R. § 229.10.
38. 17 C.F.R. § 229.10. Regulation S-K, adopted in 1982 to replace parallel, yet duplicative
disclosure systems under the Securities and Exchange Acts, is an "integrated disclosure system" appli-
cable to all issuers. It applies to the annual and quarterly reports filed by issuers under the Exchange
Act and the securities offering registration statements filed pursuant to the Securities Act. In 1992,
"small business issuers" were allowed to comply with the more simplified disclosure requirements of
Regulation S-B. See HAZEN, supra note 33, § 3.3, at 124-25.
39. 15 U.S.C. § 77c(b). Through section 3(b), the SEC is empowered to develop rules and
regulations exempting issues of securities from the registration requirements of the Securities Act so
long as the aggregate per issue offering price does not exceed $5 million. See HAZEN, supra note 33,
§ 4.15, at 196. Newly added section 4(6) of the Securities Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77d(6) (1994), allows for
small offerings up to $5 million to be made solely to "accredited investors," as defined in section
2(a)(15) of the Securities Act, id. § 77b(a)(15) (Supp. III 1997), and Securities Act Rule 215, 17
C.F.R. § 230.215. However, section 4(6) is not a viable exemption for an Internet IPO because it
prohibits the use of general solicitation and advertising.
40. HAZEN, supra note 33, § 4.13, at 186. See also HAROLD S. BLOOMENTHAL, HOLME
ROBERTS & OWEN, SECURrIES LAW HANDBOOK § 6.02[l], at 364 (1998) (calling Regulation A "a
less stringent form of registration for relatively small offerings").
41. 17 C.F.R. § 230.251-.263.
42. Id. § 230.504.
43. Other rules promulgated by the SEC include: Securities Act Rule 505 of Regulation D, id.
§ 230.505; Securities Act Rule 701, id. § 230.701; and Regulation CE, id. § 230.1001. Offerings
made pursuant to Rule 505, which allows issuers to offer and sell up to $5 million in securities within
any twelve-month period, are not discussed in this Article because issuers cannot conduct a Rule 505
offering over the Internet. This preclusion stems from the prohibition on the issuer, or any person
acting on the issuer's behalf, from offering or selling securities by "any form of general solicitation or
general advertising .... Id. § 230.502(c). Rule 701 exempts from the Securities Act registration
requirements offerings by certain issuers of securities to employees, directors, officers, and/or consult-
ants pursuant to either a written compensatory benefit plan or a written compensatory contract. Thus,
Rule 701 is not materially relevant to a discussion of Internet SIPOs. Finally, Regulation CE provides
an exemption for offers and sales of securities that satisfy the conditions of section 25102(n) of the
California Corporations Code. Because the exemption is limited to California issuers and non-
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Virtually all small business issuers that have conducted Internet IPOs
to date have utilized the second alternative rather than the first.44 While
both alternatives satisfy the primary goal of these issuers-the ability to
solicit the general public-only the second alternative does so in a highly
cost-effective manner and with less governmental involvement. The sec-
ond alternative achieves this in several ways.
First, disclosure requirements are significantly less stringent and less
expensive to comply with under the second alternative. While a Regula-
tion A offering and a full-fledged registered offering have many similari-
ties,45 the SEC allows corporate issuers preparing Regulation A offering
circulars to format them based on either Offering Circular Model A or B of
Form 1-A, Part I of Form SB-2,4 6 or the state-developed Form U-7. 47 Both
California issuers with a significant nexus to California, and restricts offers and sales to qualified pur-
chasers, it is not materially relevant to a discussion of Internet SIPOs.
44. Andy Klein's Spring Street Brewing Company has conducted two Internet offerings pursu-
ant to Regulation A. Spring Street offered up to 2,702,700 shares of its common stock at a price of
$1.85 per share pursuant to an offering statement on Form 1-A under Regulation A, qualified by the
SEC on February 6, 1995. The offering statement contains the offering circular used to market the
shares. See SPRING STREET BREWING COMPANY, INC., UP TO 2,702,700 SHARES OF COMMON STOCK
AT $1.85 PER SHARE (1995) [hereinafter SPRING STREET OFFERING CIRCULAR I]. Spring Street subse-
quently offered up to 1,200,000 shares of its common stock at a price of $2.75 per share pursuant to an
offering statement on Form 1-A under Regulation A, qualified by the SEC on September 30, 1996.
The offering statement contains the offering circular used to market those shares. See SPRING STREET
BREWING COMPANY, INC., UP TO 1,200,000 SHARES OF COMMON STOCK AT $2.75 PER SHARE (1996)
[hereinafter SPRING STREET OFFERING CIRCULAR II].
45. Because of these similarities, Regulation A is often mistakenly referred to as a "mini-
registration." See RICHARD W. JENNINGS, HAROLD MARSH, JR., JOHN C. COFFEE, JR. & JOEL
SELIGMAN, SECURITIES REGULATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 433 (8th ed. 1998) [hereinafter
JENNINGS ET AL., SECURITIES REGULATION]; HAZEN, supra note 33, § 4.15, at 196. See also LARRY
D. SODERQUIST, UNDERSTANDING THE SECURITIES LAWS 137 (3d ed. 1996) ("In the vernacular of se-
curities lawyers, a Regulation A transaction has ... been called a short-form registration."). These
similarities include, among others:
(i) a mandatory filing of an offering statement on Form I-A with the SEC much like the
filing requirement for an issuer in a registered offering;
(ii) preparation of an offering circular containing a substantial portion of the information
that must be included in a prospectus used in connection with a registered offering;
(iii) the SEC staff's comment/review process that must be completed prior to consummat-
ing sales of securities;
(iv) the permissible use of a preliminary offering circular similar to the permissible use of a
preliminary ("red herring") prospectus by an issuer in a registered offering; and
(v) offering circular delivery requirements that mirror the prospectus delivery requirements
for a registered offering.
As a technical matter, however, Regulation A only provides an issuer with an exemption to registra-
tion and is not an alternative form of registration. Thus, Regulation A issuers are not subject to liabil-
ity under section 11 of the Securities Act. See 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1994); JENNINGS ET AL., SECURITIES
REGULATION, supra (noting that "Form 1-A is not a registration statement for purposes of § 11 of the
1933 Act").
46. See Form 1-A, Part I--Offering Circular, 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.253, 239.9; JENNINGS ET AL.,
FEDERAL SECURITIES LAWS, supra note 35, at 358-83. Issuers that are not corporations are not al-
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Offering Circular Model A and Form U-7 provide issuers with a "question
and answer" format in order to simplify their disclosure burden.48 With
respect to Rule 504 offerings, no federally mandated disclosure exists,
49
although those offerings "are not exempt from the antifraud, civil liability
or other provisions of the federal securities laws."
50
With respect to financial statement disclosure, Regulation A issuers
are not required to include audited financial statements in their offering
circulars unless audited financials have previously been prepared for other
purposes.5 In addition, financial statements need only comply with gen-
erally accepted accounting principles ("GAAP"), rather than with the more
complicated Regulation S-X, 52 which contains accounting disclosure
guidelines for most registered offerings.53 This difference can signifi-
cantly cut an issuer's costs associated with a Regulation A offering, as the
issuer can avoid hiring an outside accounting firm in connection with the
lowed to follow the "question and answer" format of Offering Circular Model A. Issuers preparing
offering circulars based on Part I of Form SB-2 are not required to prepare the financial statements
called for therein.
47. Form U-7 is commonly referred to as the SCOR (Small Corporate Offering Registration)
form and consists of a question and answer format developed by state securities administrators. See
CARL W. SCHNEIDER, JOSEPH M. MANKO & ROBERT S. KANT, GOING PUBLIC: PRACTICE, PROCEDURE
& CONSEQUENCES 66 (1995).
48. Although the question and answer format facilitates disclosure, some criticize it because it
does not provide an attractive means for marketing securities. See id.
49. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.502(b)(1) (1998); SCHNEIDER ET AL,., supra note 47, at 74 (noting,
however, that applicable state laws effectively limit the ability of an issuer to complete a public offer-
ing without complying with some mandated disclosure requirements). In response to perceived abuses
by issuers conducting Rule 504 offerings, the SEC is considering making state level registration and
financial statement disclosure conditions to the use of Rule 504. In addition, the SEC is considering
restricting resales of Rule 504 securities by deeming them "restricted securities," as defined under
Rule 144. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.144. See also Revision of Rule 504 of Regulation D, the "Seed Capi-
tal" Exemption, Securities Act Release No. 7541, 63 Fed. Reg. 29,168 (May 21, 1998) [hereinafter
Rule 504 Release]; Michael Schroeder, SEC Approves Rules to Curb 'Microcap' Fraud; Russell 2000,
Nasdaq Composite Post Solid Gains, WALL ST. J., Feb. 11, 1998, at C9.
50. Regulation D: Rules Governing the Limited Offer and Sale of Securities Without Registra-
tion Under the Securities Act of 1933, Preliminary Notes, 1 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 12373, at 2635
n.1 (1998).
51. See Form I-A, Part F/S; JENNINGS ET AL., FEDERAL SECURITIES LAWS, supra note 35, at
383-85. Financial statements included in a Regulation A offering circular, however, must be prepared
in accordance with U.S. generally accepted accounting principles. A different situation exists, how-
ever, with respect to state blue sky laws. Because most states require issuers to include audited finan-
cial statements in their offering materials, most Regulation A offering circulars include audited finan-
cials even though Regulation A itself ordinarily does not require them.
52. 17 C.F.R. § 228.10.
53. A small business issuer registering securities on Forms SB-I or SB-2 must include audited
financial statements. Those financial statements, however, need not comply with Regulation S-X,
except with respect to the report and qualifications of the issuer's independent accountant. See Regu-
lation S-B, Item 310, Note 2, id. § 228.3 10.
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offering. 54 Rule 504 offerings fare even better because, as noted above,
there is no federally mandated disclosure of any kind.
Second, because offerings conducted under the first alternative are
still full-fledged registered offerings rather than exempt ones, they are
subject to the full comment and review process employed by the staff of
the SEC (the "Staff"). While it is true that the Staff also subjects offering
statements on Form 1-A used for Regulation A offerings to a comparable
comment and review process, the Staff understandably is more patient and
flexible with Regulation A issuers due to such issuers' general unfamiliar-
ity with the securities laws.55 These issuers also benefit because the
Staff's accounting review of a Regulation A offering is significantly less
involved than its accounting review of a traditional registered offering due
to Regulation A's less stringent accounting requirements. 56 By contrast,
materials used in connection with Rule 504 offerings are not required to be
filed with the SEC, and thus are not reviewed by the Staff.
Third, as described more in Part I.B, Regulation A allows an issuer to
solicit indications of interest from investors prior to filing a Form 1-A of-
fering statement with the SEC. In other words, an issuer can put out
"feelers" to see if an offering is feasible without running afoul of the "gun-
jumping" prohibition of section 5(c) of the Securities Act.57 Issuers pro-
posing to engage in a registered offering, including those registered on
Forms SB-1 or SB-2, are forbidden from engaging in unauthorized public-
ity activities prior to filing a registration statement with the SEC.58
54. See SCHNEIDER Er AL., supra note 47, at 54 (reporting that accounting fees range from
$100,000 to $250,000 for a first-time issuer with no previous audits). Of course, when unaudited fi-
nancials are used, concerns about reliability and consistency arise that add to the risks of a given offer-
ing.
55. See Telephone Interview with Richard Wulff, Assistant Director-Small Business of the SEC
Division of Corporation Finance (July 23, 1997). This does not mean, however, that the Staff's re-
view/comment process for a Regulation A offering necessarily is quicker than for a full-fledged regis-
tered offering. In fact, the offerings of some Regulation A issuers have taken more than a year to sat-
isfactorily complete the Staff's review/comment process, mainly due to those issuers' inexperience
with the process itself. See id.
56. See Telephone Interview with Christina Chalk, Attorney-Adviser of the SEC Division of
Corporation Finance (July 31, 1997). Financial statements in Regulation A offerings can be unaudited
and need not comply with Regulation S-X.
57. "Gun-jumping" refers to all actions, other than certain prescribed actions, taken by or on
behalf of an issuer that have the effect of publicizing a forthcoming offering prior to the time the is-
suer has filed a registration statement with the SEC. See 15 U.S.C. § 77e(c) (1994); 17 C.F.R.
§ 230.135.
58. But see generally Solicitations of Interest Prior to an Initial Public Offering, Securities Act
Release No. 7188, [1995 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 85,639, at 86,885 (June 27,
1995) [hereinafter Proposed Rule 135d Release] (proposing Securities Act Rule 135d, which would
allow nonreporting issuers and their underwriters conducting registered offerings to "test the waters"
19981
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Fourth, because securities sold pursuant to the exemptions of either
Regulation A or Rule 504 are not listed on a stock exchange, an issuer of
those securities is not required to comply with the reporting requirements
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the "Exchange Act") until such
time as it has 500 or more security holders of record and total assets of
more than $10 million.59 Accordingly, until those two milestones are
reached, Regulation A and Rule 504 issuers avoid the substantial costs as-
sociated with the preparation and filing of annual, quarterly, and other re-
ports. By contrast, issuers engaged in full-fledged registered offerings,
even those on Forms SB-1 or SB-2, generally must comply with the Ex-
change Act's extensive reporting requirements.
60
Fifth, issuer liability concerns are lessened when issuers sell securities
pursuant to the second alternative. Registering securities on either Form
SB-1 or SB-2 subjects the issuer to section 11 and section 12(a)(2) liabil-
ity;61 selling securities pursuant to Regulation A or Rule 504 does not. 62
Finally, filing fees are lower for offerings conducted under the second
alternative than under the first. The registration fees in section 6(b) of the
Securities Act continue to apply to registrations made on either Form SB-1
or SB-2. 63 By contrast, there is no federal filing fee applicable to either
Regulation A or Rule 504 offerings,' although filing fees are incurred in
connection with state registration.
in a manner similar to Regulation A's Rule 254); The Regulation of Securities Offerings, Securities
Act Release No. 7606A, 63 Fed. Reg. 67,174 (Dec. 4, 1998) [hereinafter Aircraft Carrier Release]
(proposing to liberalize the use of "free writing" in the public offering context).
59. See 15 U.S.C. § 781(g)(1) (1994 & Supp. III 1997); 17 C.F.R. § 240.12g-1; SPRING STREET
OFFERING CIRCULAR I, supra note 44, at 4; SPRING STREET OFFERING CIRCULAR II, supra note 44, at
4-5. In fact, the SEC raised the asset threshold of the Exchange Act's periodic reporting requirements
from $5 million to $10 million because of the recent increase in Regulation A's offering limit from
$1.5 million to $5 million. The SEC was concerned that, without this change, many Regulation A
issuers would inadvertently become reporting companies under the Exchange Act. See Relief from
Reporting by Small Issuers, Securities Act Release No. 7186, [1995 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) 85,637, at 86,877 to 86,878 (June 27, 1995).
60. Those issuers are normally required to register their securities under either section 12(b) or
12(g) of the Exchange Act, because the securities are either listed on a national securities exchange,
such as the Nasdaq, or because the issuer has over $10 million in total assets and a class of 500 or
more equity securities holders of record. See 15 U.S.C. § 781(b), (g); 17 C.F.R. § 240.12g-1. Report-
ing companies are required to comply with the Exchange Act's continuous disclosure requirements.
See 15 U.S.C. § 781(b), (g); id. § 78m (1994).
61. See 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1994 & Supp. 1I 1997); id. § 771(a)(2) (Supp. III 1997).
62. See Choi, supra note 25, at 34-35. See generally JENNINGS ET AL., SECURITIES REGU-
LATION, supra note 45, at 433.
63. See 15 U.S.C. § 77f(b) (1994 & Supp. III 1997).
64. Prior to 1996, Rule 252(0 of Regulation A required an issuer to pay a $500 filing fee. See
17 C.F.R. § 230.252(0 (1995).
INTERNET PUBLIC OFFERINGS
Despite these advantages, offerings conducted pursuant to small issue
offering exemptions do have two important drawbacks. First, despite the
adoption of the National Securities Markets Improvement Act of 1996
("NSMIA"), 65 securities issued under the exemptive authority of section
3(b) of the Securities Act do not qualify as "covered securities" under sec-
tion 18(b) of the Securities Act.66 Therefore, they must continue to be
registered under the blue sky laws of the states in which they will be of-
fered and sold.67 By contrast, securities registered on Forms SB-1 and SB-
2 are treated as "covered securities" if they are listed for trading on the
New York Stock Exchange ("NYSE"), the American Stock Exchange
("AMEX"), the National Market System of Nasdaq, or certain other ex-
changes. 68 Nevertheless, because it is unlikely that many Form SB-1 or
SB-2 issuers will meet the listing requirements of those exchanges, SIPO
issuers are not necessarily any worse off in this regard.
69
A second drawback is that securities issued pursuant to small issue of-
fering exemptions lack a liquid secondary trading market. In comparison,
fully registered securities listed on securities exchanges provide investors
with a quick and easy way in which to monetize their investments. As dis-
cussed below, however, Andy Klein's BBTS initiative constitutes an im-
portant first step in providing desperately needed liquidity to Regulation A
and Rule 504 securities.
70
65. Pub. L. No. 104-290, 110 Stat. 3416 (1996).
66. See 15 U.S.C. § 77r(b)(4)(C)-(D) (Supp. III 1997).
67. The SEC is currently considering denying Rule 504 issuers a federal exemption if they fail
to make requisite state blue sky law filings. See Rule 504 Release, supra note 49; Schroeder, supra
note 49.
68. See 15 U.S.C. §77r(b)(1)(A). To the extent securities registered with the SEC are not listed
on any of those exchanges, full-fledged registration provides no state blue sky benefits over a section
3(b) exemption.
69. Under Securities Act section 18(b)(1)(B), the SEC can determine by rule that securities
listed or authorized for listing on a given national securities exchange are "covered" if the listing re-
quirements for that exchange are substantially similar to those of the NYSE, AMEX, or National Mar-
ket System of Nasdaq. For example, through its adoption of Rule 146(b), the SEC recently designated
securities listed on the Chicago Board Options Exchange, Tier I of the Pacific Stock Exchange, and
Tier I of the Philadelphia Stock Exchange as covered securities for purposes of section 18. See 17
C.F.R. § 230.146(b) (1998); Covered Securities Pursuant to § 18 of the Securities Act of 1933, Secu-
rities Act Release No. 7494, 1804 Fed. Reg. 80,101 (Jan. 2, 1998).
70. See infra text accompanying notes 134-36. But see Rule 504 Release, supra note 49;
Schroeder, supra note 49 (noting that the SEC is considering imposing resale restrictions on Rule 504
securities).
1998]
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B. REGULATION A VERSUS RULE 504
Once an issuer decides to proceed with an Internet offering pursuant
to a SIPO registration exemption, it must choose between proceeding un-
der Regulation A or Rule 504. Until 1992, the choice was easy. Rule 504,
as it then existed, placed restrictions on an issuer's ability to solicit the
general public-the primary goal of those engaged in Internet IPOs.
71
"Old" Rule 504 also placed limits on an investor's ability to resell Rule
504 securities and conditioned its exemption upon the issuer's registration
of the offering with state securities regulators.72 Those restrictions made
Rule 504 unpalatable to many issuers.73 The Small Business Initiatives
adopted in 1992, however, eliminated those restrictions.
74
Despite the fact that Rule 504 contains no mandatory disclosure pro-
visions,75 SIPO issuers typically prefer Regulation A over Rule 504 for
several reasons. First, Rule 504 places a very low limit on the dollar
amount of securities that can be offered. An issuer cannot offer more than
$1 million of securities pursuant to that rule and any other section 3(b) ex-
emption within a twelve-month period.76 By contrast, Regulation A allows
an issuer to raise up to $5 million through the sale of securities within a
twelve-month period.77 Issuers seeking to raise more than $5 million in
one offering from the public have to conduct a full-fledged registered of-
fering.
78
71. See Small Business Initiatives, Securities Act Release No. 6949, (1992 Transfer Binder]
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 72,439, at 62,165 (Aug. 13, 1992) [hereinafter SBI Release].
72. The SEC is considering bringing back the state level registration condition and the restric-
tions on resales. See Rule 504 Release, supra note 49; Schroeder, supra note 49.
73. See Rule 504 Release, supra note 49; Schroeder, supra note 49.
74. See Impact of Small Business Initiatives, supra note 33.
75. Rule 505(b)(1) of Regulation D requires issuers to satisfy the informational requirements of
Rule 502(b). See 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.502(b), .505(b)(1) (1998). Rule 253 of Regulation A requires an
issuer's offering circular to include the narrative and financial information required by Form I-A, see
id. § 230.253, while Rule 252(a) requires "any other material information necessary to make the re-
quired statements, in light of the circumstances under which they are made, not misleading," see id.
§ 230.252(a).
76. See id. § 230.504(b)(2).
77. See id. § 230.251(b). "Regulation A provides a greater opportunity to small businesses for
capital-raising than before because it allows them to sell more than three times the previous amount
while remaining exempt from the full registration process and reporting status." Impact of Small
Business Initiatives, supra note 33, at 519.
78. Issuers qualifying as small business issuers can register up to $10 million of securities on
streamlined Form SB-I or more than $10 million on Form SB-2, rather than on the traditional Form S-
1. This is true even though an issuer may have recently sold securities pursuant to an exemption un-
der Regulation A, as offers and sales made pursuant to a full-fledged registration will not be integrated
as a general matter with those made in reliance on Regulation A. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.25 l(c)(2)(i).
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A second, though intangible, advantage of Regulation A lies in the in-
ference perceived by the investing public that the SEC has "blessed" each
Regulation A offering. This inference arises from specific references to
the SEC contained in a Regulation A offering circular.79 Although the
SEC has gone to great lengths to dispel this inference, 80 the fact remains
that investors take comfort in knowing that the Staff has reviewed an offer-
ing 8' even though its review may have been less stringent than one given
to a registered offering.
82
A third advantage of Regulation A involves its detailed disclosure re-
quirements. Once the Staff believes that an issuer's Form 1-A offering
statement, including the offering circular, satisfies those disclosure re-
quirements, the SEC will qualify its use.83 Thereafter, an issuer can have
at least some confidence that its offering circular satisfies those require-
ments. Rule 504, by contrast, does not contain a detailed disclosure blue-
print.84 Thus, an issuer must turn to other provisions of federal and/or
state law to aid it in preparing offering materials.
79. The offering circular in an issuer's Form 1-A has the appearance, but not the complete sub-
stance, of a regular prospectus used in connection with a registered offering. For better or for worse,
an offering circular will make specific reference to the fact that the offering statement on Form I-A is
filed with the SEC, and that the form can be reviewed at the SEC's public reference room in Washing-
ton, D.C. See, e.g., SPRING STREET OFFERING CIRCULAR I, supra note 44, at Inside Cover Page. In
addition, the cover of the offering circular contains a mandatory legend that references the SEC. See
17 C.F.R. § 230.253(d); Form I-A, Part II (Offering Circular Model A, Cover Page; Offering Circular
Model B, Item 1, Cover Page); JENNINGS ET AL., FEDERAL SECURITIES LAW, supra note 35, at 359-60,
375.
80. The SEC requires an issuer to print the following legend on the cover page of its offering
circular in bold capital letters at least as large as that used generally in the body of the offering circu-
lar:
THE UNITED STATES SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION DOES NOT
PASS UPON THE MERITS OF OR GIVE ITS APPROVAL TO ANY SECURITIES
OFFERED OR THE TERMS OF THE OFFERING, NOR DOES IT PASS UPON THE
ACCURACY OR COMPLETENESS OF ANY OFFERING CIRCULAR OR OFFERED
SELLING LITERATURE. THESE SECURITIES ARE OFFERED PURSUANT TO AN
EXEMPTION FROM REGISTRATION WITH THE COMMISSION; HOWEVER, THE
COMMISSION HAS NOT MADE AN INDEPENDENT DETERMINATION THAT THE
SECURITIES OFFERED HEREUNDER ARE EXEMPT FROM REGISTRATION.
17 C.F.R. § 230.253(d).
81. Professor Coffee argues that the SEC is the "most logical gatekeeper" to assure informa-
tional veracity in connection with self-managed equity offerings, and that the SEC's services as a
gatekeeper are valuable. Coffee, supra note 27, at 1213. See also Choi, supra note 25, at 30 (arguing
that in an Internet-based securities market, regulators may 'join the competitive arena as potential
certifiers of investment information and value"); Abba David Poliakoff, SEC Review: Comfort or l-
lusion?, 17 U. BALT. L. REV. 40 (1987) (arguing that the SEC's gatekeeper function is valuable).
82. See supra text accompanying notes 55-56.
83. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.252(g).
84. See id. § 230.502(b)(1).
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A final advantage is Regulation A's new "test the waters" provision
adopted in 1992.85 Labeled the "most innovative and controversial devel-
opment under the [Small Business Initiatives],"86 Rule 254 of Regulation
A permits an issuer to "publish or deliver to prospective purchasers a
written document or make scripted radio or television broadcasts to de-
termine whether there is any interest in a contemplated securities offer-
ing. 's In other words, an issuer can test the waters prior to committing
substantial managerial energy and financial resources to an offering when
its successful completion is far from certain.8 8 While presumably a Rule
504 issuer can similarly test the waters and attempt to offer and sell secu-
rities based merely on a few oral representations, 89 Regulation A issuers
can rest easy at least with respect to federal law by simply following the
safe harbor guidelines of Rule 254.
Rule 254 requires issuers to submit written documents or scripts of
any broadcast to the SEC on or before the date of their first use.90 Once
these submissions have been made, oral communications between issuers
and prospective investors are permissible, although those communications
are still subject to the antifraud provisions of the federal securities laws.
91
Furthermore, the SEC has specifically provided that solicitation materials
that comply with the provisions of Rule 254 "shall not be deemed to be a
prospectus as defined in section 2(10) of the Securities Act."92 Solicita-
85. See SBI Release, supra note 71. Prior to the Small Business Initiatives, Regulation A issu-
ers were prohibited from engaging in prefiling publicity by Rule 255(a). See 17 C.F.R. § 230.255(a)
(1992). For a discussion of the merits and drawbacks of Regulation A's "test the waters" provision,
see Note, "Testing the Waters"-the SEC's Feet Go from Wet to Cold, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 464
(1998).
86. Impact of Small Business Initiatives, supra note 33, at 517. See also SCHNEIDER ET AL.,
supra note 47, at 67 (describing the test the waters provision as "potentially a very valuable technique
that cannot be used currently in the context of a registered public offering").
87. 17 C.F.R. § 230.254(a) (1998). The SEC has elaborated that communication with prospec-
tive investors through any print, broadcast, telephone, facsimile, or electronic medium, including the
Internet, would be permissible. See Proposed Rule 135d Release, supra note 58, at 86,888.
88. Securities Act Rule 254 is particularly significant in light of the strict limits placed on what
issuers can say about their proposed registered offerings. See 15 U.S.C. § 77e(c) (1994); 17 CF.R.
§ 230.135. Furthermore, only nonreporting issuers can take advantage of Regulation A, while only
reporting issuers can distribute notices concerning proposed unregistered offerings pursuant to Secu-
rities Act Rule 135c. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.135c. Thus, without the test the waters provision, an issuer
that meets Regulation A's issuer requirements could not say anything publicly about its proposed of-
fering prior to filing its Form I-A with the SEC.
89. See SODERQUIST, supra note 45, at 145-46.
90. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.254(b)(1). However, such submission is "not a condition to any ex-
emption pursuant to this section .... Id. § 230.254(b).
91. See id. § 230.254(a).
92. Id. § 230.254(e).
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tions under the rule, however, must cease once an issuer files its Form 1-A
offering statement with the SEC.93
Not surprisingly, Rule 254 prohibits issuers from soliciting or accept-
ing money or other consideration from prospective investors, or requiring
any binding or nonbinding commitment from prospective investors. 94 Is-
suers also cannot consummate actual sales of securities until the later of
either the date on which the offering statement is qualified by the SEC or
twenty calendar days after the last publication or delivery of solicitation
materials.
95
Surprisingly, the SEC does not give specific guidance regarding what
issuers may say to the public about their proposed Regulation A offerings
in test the waters solicitations. The SEC has simply stated that "the written
documents, broadcasts and oral communications are each subject to the
antifraud provisions of the federal securities laws." 96 The SEC, however,
does require an issuer to:
(i) state that no money or other consideration is being solicited, and if
sent in response, will not be accepted;
(ii) state that no sales of the securities will be made or commitment to
purchase accepted until delivery of an offering circular that includes
complete information about the issuer and the offering;
(iii) state that an indication of interest made by a prospective investor in-
volves no obligation or commitment of any kind; and
(iv) identify the chief executive officer of the issuer and briefly and in
general its business and products.
97
Thus, "[a]side from a few essentially formal items of required disclosure,
the test the waters document is essentially 'free writing"'; issuers
presumably could distribute copies of their business plans to members of
the public.
98
93. See id. § 230.254(b)(3).
94. See id. § 230.254(a).
95. See id. § 230.254(a), (b)(4).
96. Id. § 230.254(a).
97. Id. § 230.254(b)(2). Interestingly, the SEC specifically states that the inclusion of the
above-mentioned information is "not a condition to any exemption pursuant to this section." Id.
§ 230.254(b). Presumably, issuers who fail to include this information in their test the waters solicita-
tions expose themselves to SEC fines, sanctions, or other penalties, but not a loss of their section 3(b)
exemption.
98. SCHNEIDER ET AL., supra note 47, at 65. See also BLOOMENTHAL, supra note 40, § 6.02[6],
at 373.
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Regulation A's test the waters provision, however, has proven con-
troversial on at least two levels.99 First, leaving aside investor protection
concerns, it seems patently unfair to allow proposed Regulation A issuers
to "gun jump" when issuers planning traditional registered offerings are
prohibited from doing so.1°0 After all, the same "gun-jumping" concern
about conditioning the market prior to the availability of a legally adequate
disclosure document exists in both cases.101 While the SEC has proffered
Proposed Rule 135d to allow such efforts by nonreporting issuers and their
underwriters proposing to conduct registered offerings, prefiling publicity
efforts currently remain unlawful.10 2
Second, the SEC adopted Rule 254 without adequately addressing the
concerns of state securities regulators. 10 3 State regulators have expressed
their belief that Rule 254 "deregulates the riskiest securities, small tenta-
tive offerings, leaving investors unprotected and vulnerable to sales tech-
niques employed by these businesses."'1 4 States can impede issuers' use
of the test the waters provision by maintaining conflicting regulations or
by prohibiting such solicitations outright.10 5 Indeed, as one commentator
has pointed out, "[i]f the test the waters provision is to be meaningful, it
needs the cooperation of [the North American Securities Administrators
Association, Inc.] and the blue sky administrators, or preemptive legisla-
tion from Congress."' 10
6
Clearly, the test the waters provision underscores the fact that the
SEC has placed the interests of small businesses ahead of those of more
mature businesses. The ability to test the marketplace prior to incurring
99. For a listing of certain commentators' critical assessment of the Small Business Initiatives
in general and Regulation A's test the waters provision in particular, see Note, supra note 85, at 494
n.206.
100. The SEC is contemplating the adoption of a similar "test the waters" rule for registered
IPOs conducted by nonreporting issuers. See Proposed Rule 135d Release, supra note 58, at 86,885.
In addition, the SEC has proposed liberalizing the use of "free writing" in the context of registered
offerings. See Aircraft Carrier Release, supra note 58.
101. See Coffee, supra note 27, at 1205-06 (calling Regulation A's test the waters provision a
"loophole" and arguing that the adoption of a similar provision, like Proposed Rule 135d, for regis-
tered offerings "seems likely to trivialize the preliminary prospectus").
102. See 15 U.S.C. § 77e(c) (1994); 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.134, .135, .137-.139. But see Proposed
Rule 135d Release, supra note 58, at 86,885; Aircraft Carrier Release, supra note 58.
103. See Impact of Small Business Initiatives, supra note 33, at 520-21.
104. Id. See also Rosalyn Retkwa, States Slap Roadblock on SEC's Small Business Initiatives,
CORP. CASHFLOW, Apr. 1993, at 37, 37-39 (explaining how "unethical operators will 'drop the hook'
with an oral pitch, and investors won't pay attention to the written disclosure documents that arrive
later").
105. See discussion supra text accompanying notes 65-69; Impact of Small Business Initiatives,
supra note 33, at 520-21.
106. BLOOMENTHAL, supra note 40, § 6.02[6], at 374.
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the costs of an offering is a tremendous advantage for small businesses. It
is troubling, however, that the SEC appears to have placed the promotion
of small businesses above its mandate of investor protection. While the
test the waters provision has been chalked up to election year politics
1 °7
and contains some prophylactic measures to protect investors, 10 8 the fact
remains that Regulation A issuers can solicit the general public without
concurrently providing them with full disclosure.
C. THE INTERNET AND THE RENAISSANCE OF SMALL ISSUE
PUBLIC OFFERINGS
The SIPO exemptions of Regulation A and Rule 504 have had
dramatically different histories prior to their use with self-managed offer-
ings over the Internet. Regulation A, on the one hand, is the elder states-
person of the section 3(b) small issue exemptions."0 9 Since its adoption in
1936, the maximum amount of capital an issuer can raise under Regulation
A has grown from $100,000 to $5 million. 110 Prior to the late 1970s,
Regulation A was widely used by small issuers."' However, with the
SEC's adoption of simplified small business registration on Form S-18 in
1979, Regulation A temporarily became a "dead letter."'" 2  In 1992,
Regulation A was modestly revived when the SEC adopted the Small
Business Initiatives.
113
107. The Small Business Initiatives were announced and hastily enacted soon after "President
George Bush announced his intention to assist small businesses as a method of improving economic
conditions during the 1992 presidential campaign." Impact of Small Business Initiatives, supra note
33, at 523.
108. See supra notes 90, 94-95, and accompanying text.
109. See HAZEN, supra note 33, § 4.15, at 196.
110. When Regulation A was first adopted by the SEC, the maximum amount of an offering
permitted under section 3(b) and Regulation A was $100,000. Pursuant to statutory authorization, the
SEC amended Regulation A in 1945 to increase that amount to $300,000. In 1971, the SEC increased
it again to $500,000. In 1978, the maximum amount of an offering was raised to $1.5 million, even
though the SEC had the authority to increase it to $2 million. See Increase in Amount of Small Offer-
ing Exemption, Securities Act Release No. 5977, [1978 Transfer Binder) Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 81,710,
at 80,877 (Sept. 11, 1978). In July 1992, the SEC increased Regulation A's maximum offering
amount to $5 million. See SBI Release, supra note 71, at 62,167.
111. See HAZEN, supra note 33, § 4.15, at 196 n.3; SODERQUIST, supra note 45, at 139.
112. See SODERQUIST, supra note 45, at 139. See also Impact of Small Business Initiatives, su-
pra note 33, at 516 ("Utilization of the Regulation A exemption had decreased substantially in the
years prior to 1992, so the SEC remodeled the exemption to stimulate its use by small businesses.").
As a minor piece of anecdotal evidence, this author had never met any securities law practitioner who
had ever represented a client in a Regulation A offering or, for that matter, knew anyone who had
conducted a Regulation A offering until recently.
113. See BLOOMENTHAL, supra note 40, § 6.02[l], at 365; JENNINGS ET AL., SECURITIES
REGULATION, supra note 45, at 432. Regulation A was revitalized in part by raising its dollar limita-
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Rule 504, on the other hand, forms part of Regulation D though it
seems ill-suited for such inclusion. Indeed, Rule 504 is largely severed
from Regulation D except for the integration provisions of Rule 502(a) and
the Rule 503 requirement that a Form D be filed. 114 Rule 504, like Regu-
lation A, received a boost in 1992 from the adoption of the Small Business
Initiatives and the removal of the rule's public solicitation restrictions,
state level filing requirement, and resale restrictions.
While Regulation A and Rule 504 certainly were not created with the
Internet in mind, the Internet with its World Wide Web ll 5 appears to be
the optimal SIPO launching pad." 6 Today, a "plethora of IPO-related
sites" exist on the Web and provide "IPO information to users, all instan-
taneously and free of charge."" 7 The reasons why the Internet has trans-
formed the way in which SIPOs are conducted and why it will revolution-
ize the traditional registered offering process in the future are threefold.
First, the Internet minimizes the costs associated with producing of-
fering materials." 8 Instead of incurring the substantial expense associated
with printing those materials, an issuer engaged in a SIPO can simply
place those materials on a Web site established specifically for its offer-
ing. 119 This has become so incredibly simple that even a nontechnophile
tion to $5 million, adding the test the waters provision in Rule 254, and adding the good faith compli-
ance provision in Rule 260. See BLOOMENTHAL, supra note 40, § 6.02[1], at 365.
114. See 3A HAROLD S. BLOOMENTHAL & SAMUEL WOLFF, SECURITIES AND FEDERAL
CORPORATE LAW § 5.08[1] (1997).
115. See supra note 2.
116. See Loeb & Richter, supra note 8, at 325-26 (noting that "development stage issu-
ers... may stand to benefit the most from electronic offerings").
117. Cella & Stark, supra note 2, at 819 (citing Deborah Lohse, Want PO Information? Try the
Internet, WALL ST. J., Oct. 21, 1996, at Cl).
118. See Loeb & Richter, supra note 8 ("Put simply, cyberspace is a new frontier of securities
law, offering a new means of capital formation at a fraction of the cost of traditional methods.").
119. Due to the federal antifraud provisions, an issuer must be careful not to place its circular
within any of its existing Web sites, especially one used for marketing its products or services, lest the
information that is extraneous to the offering be deemed incorporated by reference into the offering
circular. Similarly, an issuer must be careful not to hyperlink its offering Web site to other Web sites,
and vice versa, due to the same antifraud concerns.
Yahoo! Inc.'s on-line registered IPO of common stock in 1996 followed these precautionary
methods. Yahoo, whose primary business is to assist on-line users by providing hyperlinks to Intemet
sites of interest, included a copy of the home page of its regular Web site in its on-line prospectus.
(Yahoo's Web site address for its offering was <http:/7ipo.yahoo.com>, however, the on-line prospec-
tus is no longer available.) Yahoo disconnected the hyperlinks on that page to prevent all the infor-
mation on the Internet that a user could peruse from the home page of its regular Web site from being
incorporated by reference into Yahoo's prospectus and thus subjected to the federal antifraud provi-
sions. While this precaution may seem ludicrous to those unfamiliar with securities laws, it under-
scores the primary need of putting a box around an issuer's on-line offering materials to limit liability.
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can succeed. 120 For example, if a Regulation A issuer makes use of a pre-
liminary offering circular, 12 1 the issuer can easily amend that circular'22 or
convert it instantly on-line into its final offering circular 23 by simply fill-
ing in price-dependent information once that information is known.124 In-
deed, in a pure Internet offering, an issuer need only create an on-line ver-
sion of its offering materials.
125
Second, SIPO issuers can minimize the substantial mailing and distri-
bution expenses associated with sending offering materials to potential in-
vestors. 126 Once an issuer places its materials on-line, a potential investor
120. According to Celia and Stark:
Finding space on a server is easy and cheap; promoters of servers have become ubiquitous
on the Web and in the telephone yellow pages. Many [Internet] access providers even allo-
cate to users free space for their own Web sites, in exchange for merely signing an access
agreement. Moreover, countless software packages offer users simple and easy to follow
instructions that make constructing a good looking Web site as easy as typing a word proc-
essing document. So, building the Web site is a breeze, hooking it up on the Web is a snap,
and you need not be a programmer or technophile to succeed.
Celia & Stark, supra note 2, at 821-22 (emphasis added).
121. Similar to the ability of an issuer in a registered offering to make written offers by means of
a preliminary or "red herring" prospectus once its registration statement has been filed with the SEC, a
Regulation A issuer is allowed to make written offers by means of a preliminary offering circular once
its offering statement on Form 1-A has been filed with the SEC. Compare 15 U.S.C. §§ 77e(b)(1),
77j(b) (1994) (discussing use of preliminary prospectus in registered offering) with 17 C.F.R.
§§ 230.251(d)(1)(ii)(B), .255 (1998) (discussing use of preliminary offering circular in Regulation A
offering).
122. See 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.252(h), .255(b).
123. The process of creating a preliminary or final offering circular for an on-line offering is
virtually the same as for a paper-based offering, except for one wrinkle. In both a paper-based and on-
line offering, the text of the offering circular is prepared using any number of popular word-processing
programs. Instead of printing and photocopying the circular for distribution, an issuer engaged in an
on-line offering can simply convert the word processed document of the offering circular into a com-
puter-based format with the click of a button. Once converted, the reformatted document can be read
by an Internet Web browser. In many ways, the conversion process is similar to translating a docu-
ment in English into Spanish so that it can be read by another audience. Like all conversions, a
document will not be converted from a word-processing format to a Web-supported format perfectly
the first time, and thus certain remediation must be completed before allowing access to it.
124. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.255(a)(2) (detailing the price-dependent information that may be
omitted from a preliminary offering circular).
125. It is hard to predict at what point in the future issuers will only create an on-line version of
their offering circulars. To date, all Regulation A issuers known by this author to have conducted on-
line offerings created both on-line and paper-based versions of their offering circulars. See, e.g.,
SPRING STREET OFFERING CIRCULAR I, supra note 44; SPRING STREET OFFERING CIRCULAR II, supra
note 44. The exclusive computerization of offering materials will gradually occur as the investing
public becomes increasingly familiar with and dependent on investing on-line and as on-line technol-
ogy evolves. See Jill E. Fisch, Can Internet Offerings Bridge the Small Business Capital Barrier?, 2
J. SMALL & EMERGING Bus. L. 57, 77 (1998) (arguing that "Internet offerings will undoubtedly be-
come more successful as investors and issuers become accustomed to electronic offering procedures").
126. According to the SEC, electronic media "enhances the efficiency of the securities markets
by allowing for the rapid dissemination of information to investors and financial markets in a more
cost-efficient, widespread and equitable manner than traditional paper-based methods." Use of Elec-
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"[o]utfitted with a home computer, some software, a phone line, and an
Internet access provider"'127 can either view the offering circular while
visiting the issuer's home page on the Internet or download it electroni-
cally for later on-screen viewing or printing if a hard copy is desired.128
Thanks to the SEC's recent proactive position on both prospectus and of-
fering circular delivery requirements, 129 Regulation A issuers can now
satisfy their obligation to deliver a final offering circular electronically.13
0
Because an offering's home page constitutes a passive informational
delivery system, the toughest job of an issuer conducting an on-line SIPO
is luring potential investors to that home page to learn more about the of-
fering. But here, too, the Internet can help. First, some of the money
saved by not printing and mailing substantial quantities of offering mate-
rials can be used for strategically placed advertisements that will alert po-
tential investors to the offering's existence and home page address.
131
tronic Media for Delivery Purposes Release, supra note 11, at 3129. See also Choi, supra note 25, at
39 ("Through Interet-based offerings, small businesses may reach the attention of potentially thou-
sands, or even millions, of investors with little cost or effort.").
127. Celia & Stark, supra note 2, at 815. See also Klein, supra note I, at 90 ("[A]II the would-be
investor had to do was click on the button to view the prospectus, download it, and print it.").
128. The SEC requires issuers not to make investor access to electronically delivered informa-
tion unduly burdensome. For example, issuers may not require investors to proceed through "a con-
fusing series of ever-changing menus to access a required document." Use of Electronic Media for
Delivery Purposes Release, supra note 11, at 3131-2 n.24. Indeed, investor access to electronic
documents must be comparable to the access they have to documents received through the postal mail.
See id. at 3131-2.
129. See id., supra note 11, at 3129 n.9; Loeb & Richter, supra note 8, at 321-24. See also John
R. Hewitt, SEC Takes Control of Cyberspace, N.Y.L.J., Aug. 1, 1996, at 5 (stating that the Use of
Electronic Media for Delivery Purposes Release demonstrates that the SEC "obviously is encouraging
the use of electronic delivery").
The SEC's main concerns relating to electronic delivery have been with (1) ensuring that inves-
tors are put on notice that they have information meriting their review and (2) evidencing the satisfac-
tion of delivery requirements. With respect to notice, no additional notice is required when informa-
tion is transmitted via the postal system or through an e-mail. Issuers that transmit information to
investors over a passive informational delivery system, such as a home page on the Web, however,
must provide investors with actual notice of the availability of the final prospectus or offering circular.
Actual notice can be given by e-mall or regular postal mall. See Use of Electronic Media by Broker-
Dealers Release, supra note 11, at 24,646 n.21. With respect to evidencing the satisfaction of delivery
requirements, an issuer relying on an electronic medium can do so through:
(a) obtaining an investor's informed consent to receive information through a given elec-
tronic medium, so long as the requirements of access and notice are also met;
(b) obtaining actual evidence of delivery, such as a return e-mail receipt or confirmation
that an investor has accessed, downloaded, or printed the offering document; or
(c) obtaining evidence that an investor has accessed another document that contains a hy-
perlink to the offering document in question.
See Use of Electronic Media for Delivery Purposes Release, supra note 11, at 3131-3.
130. See Use of Electronic Media for Delivery Purposes Release, supra note 11, at 3131-6.
131. For example, Spring Street strategically placed quarter-page ads twice in the sports section
of USA Today, alerting potential investors to the existence of its first Regulation A offering and its
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Second, as discussed earlier in the context of a Regulation A offering, e-
mail can be used first to test the waters electronically and later to transmit
offering materials to potential investors who have returned indications of
interest. 132 Finally, a number of Web sites have sprung up that provide
centralized locations at which prospective inyestors can learn about public
offerings-including Regulation A and Rule 504 offerings-and, in certain
cases, private offerings.
133
Internet address for the offering. Spring Street also placed ads with respect to its second Regulation A
offering. See SPRING STREET OFFERING CIRCULAR II, supra note 44, at 6-7. Of course, the same
strategy can be used in the context of a registered offering conducted on-line. For example, Salomon
Brothers Inc created a home page for Berkshire Hathaway Inc.'s 1996 offering of Class B Common
Stock. Salomon placed a full-page ad in the Wall Street Journal in conformity with Securities Act
Rule 134 to alert potential investors of, among other things, the offering's home page address that in-
cluded a prospectus and a list of selling group members. See Berkshire Hathaway Inc. Class B Com-
mon Stock Offering, WALL ST. J., Apr. 22, 1996, at C9.
With the ability to engage in general solicitation and advertising, SIPO issuers have conjured up
creative ways to "get the word out" about their offerings. Spring Street, for example, publicized its
offerings at beer festivals, through notices placed in retail stores selling microbrew beers, and even on
the sides of its six-pack beer cartons in addition to advertising in newspapers. See SPRING STREET
OFFERING CIRCULAR II, supra note 44, at 6-7. See also John Accola, Rare Stock: Little-Used Regula-
tion A Offerings Help Small Firms Like Columbine Cellars in Their Quest to Go Public, ROCKY
MOUNTAIN NEWS, Sept. 17, 1995, at 115A (discussing Columbine Cellars Ltd.'s newspaper adver-
tisement encouraging prospective investors to "Be a part of Colorado's Wine Industry!" by participat-
ing in Columbine's Regulation A offering); Levingston, supra note 14 (discussing offering materials
advertised in catalogs of goods (Real Goods Trading Corp.)); Siwolop, supra note 13 (showing how
some offering materials are advertised or available at coffee shops (Dalton Specialties Ltd.) and on
macaroni boxes (Annie's Homegrown)).
132. See discussion supra text accompanying notes 85-98; Use of Electronic Media by Broker-
Dealers Release, supra note 11, at 24,646 n.21 (discussing use of e-mail in connection with satisfying
prospectus delivery requirements); SPRING STREET OFFERING CIRCULAR II, supra note 44, at 7 ("Mhe
Company plans to contact additional potential investors by direct e-mail and regular mall solicita-
tion."). But see Citizens Protection Act of 1997, H.R. 1748, 105th Cong. (proposing to ban transmis-
sion of unsolicited advertisements by e-mail and requiring that sender identification be included with
e-mails); Amy Harmon, Biggest Sender of Junk Mail on Internet Agrees to Stop, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 29,
1998, at A23 (discussing private and public efforts to stop distribution of junk e-mails). For a discus-
sion of the numerous proposed legislative and industry responses to regulate junk e-mail, see Don
Clark, Start-Up Finn Plans to Attack Unwanted E-Mail, WALL ST. J., July 20, 1998; Rebecca Quick,
Measures to Rid Cyberspace of 'Spam' Run Into Snags, WALL ST. J., May 18, 1998, at BI; John Si-
mons, Various Firms, Groups to Offer Way to Curb Unsolicited E-Mail on Internet, WALL ST. J., July
14, 1998, at B6.
On a related note, this author recently received offering materials for a private placement via e-
mall. The materials were sent to prospective investors who had pre-qualified as accredited, foreign,
and/or sophisticated investors on IPONet's Web Site. See E-mail from b-d@iponetusa to Jeffrey J.
Hass <jhass@nyls.edu> entitled "Notice of New Private Placement" (Oct. 27, 1998) (on file with
author) (containing the Amended Confidential Private Placement Memorandum of Neighborhood Box
Office, Inc.).
133. See, e.g., Direct Stock Market, Inc. (visited Mar. 1, 1998) <http:llwww.direct-stock-
market.com>; IPONet Home Page (visited Mar. 1, 1998) <http:llwww.zanax.comliponet> (IPONet has
recently been folded into Rule506.com located at <http://www.ruleS06.corn>.).
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The third reason why the Internet has transformed the way in which
SIPOs are conducted is that the Internet has at least eased the illiquidity
problem associated with SIPO securities by allowing issuers to develop
and maintain on-line BBTSs. BBTSs solve the most important informa-
tional problem associated with illiquid securities-namely, the identities of
those interested in selling and buying the securities at any given time.134 A
typical BBTS will contain on-line lists of sellers and buyers, including the
amount and price of securities willing to be sold or bought, and pertinent
contact information such as telephone numbers and e-mail addresses. In-
dividual sellers and buyers may then independently contact each other in
order to enter into buy/sell arrangements. The consummation of these ar-
rangements is facilitated by an independent agent, such as a bank stock
transfer department or escrow agent hired by the issuer. Because of the
substantial opportunity for investor fraud and market manipulation in this
area, 13 5 the SEC has issued several no-action letters that detail the prophy-
lactic measures that issuers must adopt in connection with their BBTSs.1
36
The absolute raw power of a SIPO offering conducted over the Inter-
net can be seen in a very simple, yet realistic example. Suppose an em-
bryonic manufacturer of custom-made golf clubs is in need of $3 million
of new capital and is considering raising it in a Regulation A offering. The
manufacturer can then conduct an offering in two stages, depending on
whether a given state allows for pure or modified test the waters solicita-
tions. In the first stage, prior to expending considerable time and expense
on preparing offering materials and engaging in a sales campaign, the is-
134. As Celia and Stark have commented:
[S]ecurities historically doomed to bathe in their own illiquidity and large bid and asked
spreads, such as limited partnerships, thinly traded over-the-counter (OTC) "Pink Sheet"
stocks, and other securities unavailable for purchase or sale in the traditional marketplace,
now have unprecedented ways of increasing their trading volume. Whether through a pair-
ing of a buyer and seller via a simple Internet [BBTS], or through a more complicated ar-
rangement such as an online trading facility, promoters, buyers, and sellers can meet in-
stantly and transact business at very little cost to one another.
Celia & Stark, supra note 2, at 816.
Importantly, self-managed offerings apparently have piqued the interest of at least one stock ex-
change. The Pacific Stock Exchange spent three years working with state and federal regulators on
special listing rules for securities issued in self-managed offerings. To the extent stock exchanges get
into the picture, the liquidity problems associated with securities offered in self-managed offerings
could greatly ease. See Levingston, supra note 14.
135. In particular, the SEC is "concerned that investors' funds and securities be handled appro-
priately, that investors understand the risks involved in purchasing illiquid and speculative securities,
that buyers are aware of last sales prices and that investors are provided with ongoing disclosure about
the [issuer]." Spring Street No-Action Letter, supra note 11, at 77,001.
136. See, e.g., id.; Real Goods Trading No-Action Letter, supra note 11, at 77,131.
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suer can "spare' 137 golf aficionados in those states that do allow some
variant of the test the waters provision. By doing so, the issuer can gauge
the interest of those potential investors in the proposed offering. Based on
the information obtained, the issuer should then be in a position to extrapo-
late nationwide interest in the offering and make a decision about whether
to proceed. In the second stage-assuming the issuer decides to proceed
with the offering-the issuer may send offering materials via e-mail to
those who expressed interest. The issuer can also "spamn" golf aficionados
in states without test the waters provisions with offering materials after
registering its offering in those states.
138
Figuring out whom to spam is a very easy task. In much the same
way merchandisers purchase mailing lists from a variety of sources, e-mail
lists can also be purchased.139 These lists can be custom-tailored to fit the
particularized needs of the issuer. In the case of the golf club manufac-
turer, it could purchase a list of the e-mail addresses of all subscribers to
Golf Digest magazine, for example, and then simply conduct a massive
"junk" e-mail distribution to those subscribers at very little cost to itself.'4°
137. "Spamming" refers to the sending of unsolicited e-mails to multiple recipients. It is the
Internet's equivalent to "junk" mail. The terms "spamming" and "spam" were coined from a skit per-
formed by the comedic group Monty Python during which the word "span" was repeated ceaselessly.
See Amy N. Lipton & Jennifer S. Taub, Real World Examples of Successful Electronic Commerce, in
DOING BUSINESS ON THE INTERNET: THE LAW OFELECTRONIC COMMERCE 405,419 (1996).
138. Of course, this two-stage offering process can be modified. For example, an issuer that
conducts test the waters solicitations may find enough potential investors in the test the waters states
to avoid having to conduct the offering in states without test the waters provisions. Alternatively, an
issuer could proceed directly with a full-fledged Regulation A offering in a number of states without
regard to whether or not those states allow for test the waters solicitations.
139. See, e.g., E-mail from Kellner Enterprises <Mail4cash@usa.net> to Jeffrey J. Hass <jhass
@nyls.edu> entitled "$$$$ .... (received Dec. 1, 1998) (on file with author) (offering to sell a com-
pact disc with 30 million e-mail addresses for $169 plus tax and shipping).
140. Accomplishing this type of e-mail distribution is becoming easier. Recently, the Direct
Marketing Association stated the following with regard to a seminar it offered for marketing via e-
mail:
E-mail is one of the most powerful new direct marketing tools to come along in decades.
Attend this special seminar and you'll learn everything you need to know to make it work
for you including:
How to identify and purchase bonafide Spam-free e-mail lists;
How to write e-mail copy that sells;
How to piggyback other company's e-mailings through sponsorships and banner ads;
How to target your e-mail to reach your prime prospects;
How to develop and maintain your own in-house e-mail list-or how to effectively out-
source the project;
How to measure results.
DIREcr MARKETING ASS'N, A CRASH COURSE IN EMAIL MARKETING (1997) (on file with author)
(promoting a seminar on the utility of e-mail for direct marketing).
Issuers not interested in conducting the actual spamming can hire others for the job. The ex-
pense involved with spamming is minimal; in fact, one company paid a spammer only $1,000 to send
e-mails to 800,000 addresses. See Lipton & Taub, supra note 137, at 420. Cyber Promotions, Inc.,
1998]
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Another practice that aids in locating potential investors is "mining."
Mining is the collection of e-mail addresses from a particular newsgroup-
one involving golf, for example-by operating a user-friendly automated
software mining program.
141
II. UNDERWRITTEN OFFERINGS VERSUS SELF-MANAGED
OFFERINGS: INVESTMENT BANKS AND THEIR ROLE
IN PROTECTING INVESTORS
A SIPO issuer can either choose to self-manage its offering 142 or, at
least in theory, engage the services of one or more investment banking
firms to underwrite its offering. 143 If a SIPO issuer is successful in entic-
ing an investment bank to underwrite its offering, that bank, rather than the
issuer, will be directly responsible for the marketing and sales functions
relating to the offering. For the reasons that follow, however, it is the rare
SIPO that is underwritten.
The first and overriding reason for this rarity of underwriting stems
from investment banks' concern for the bottom line. Underwriters receive
a discount on the stock they purchase in an amount ranging from six to ten
percent of the aggregate offering proceeds.'" Assuming that a particular
Regulation A issuer is seeking to raise the maximum amount of $5 million,
the underwriting commission will range from $250,000 to $500,000. Un-
derwriters, on the one hand, will likely view this commission as trifling in
whose president is known as both the "Spain ing" and "Spamford" (his Internet nickname), had
claimed to have over 4,000 clients before falling on hard times. See id.; Harmon, supra note 132
(discussing Cyber Promotions agreement "to pay $2 million to settle the last of several lawsuits
brought against it by Internet service providers"). See also Jared Sandberg, AOL Declares Win Over
Junk E-Mailer and Will Receive Unspecified Damages, WALL ST. J., Dec. 19, 1997, at B6 (discussing
America On-line's federal court victory over the sparmer Over the Air Equipment Inc.).
Issuers can also engage in do-it-yourself spamming. "Thanks to the development of readily
available junk-mail software packages and mailing lists, virtually anyone can set up shop as a spam-
mer." Thomas E. Weber, EarthLink Deal Bars Junk E-Mail from Marketer, WALL ST. J., Mar. 30,
1998, at B8.
141. See Celia & Stark, supra note 2, at 830.
142. "Self-managed" means that the issuer itself performs the marketing and sales functions of
the offering, rather than having an underwriter perform those functions.
143. Regulation A contains provisions addressing the use of one or more underwriters. See, e.g.,
17 C.F.R. §§ 230.251(d)(2)(ii), .255(a)(2) (1998); Form I-A, Part 1, Item 1(i)-(m): JENNINGS ET AL.,
FEDERAL SECURITIES LAWS, supra note 35, at 357.
144. See Stoel Rives Boley Jones & Grey, GOING PUBLIC 3 (4th ed., RR Donnelley Fin.)
[hereinafter GOING PUBLIC]; Graham, supra note 14, at 76. It should be noted that underwriting ar-
rangements and underwriter compensation for an offering are reviewed by the NASD, which is the
securities industry's self-regulatory organization, "to ensure that 'arm's length' transactions are main-
tained." Hambrecht & Quist, The Initial Public Offering Process, How to Prepare an Initial Public
Offering at 397 (PLI Corp. Law & Practice Course Handbook Series No. B4-7043, 1993).
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light of the time and effort to be expended and the potential for liability
under the securities laws. 145 On the other hand, a Regulation A issuer-
especially the "do-it-yourself' maverick considering Internet IPOs-will
be reluctant to share any proceeds with an underwriter, much less reim-
burse that underwriter for out-of-pocket expenses.
146
Reputational concerns, however, also provide investment banks with
a strong incentive to avoid SIPOs. Because most SIPO issuers are not sea-
soned companies, 147 investment banks are squeamish about selling the se-
curities of those issuers to the institutional and retail clientele they worked
so hard to develop. 148  In fact, in discussing the price performance of a
stock following its offering, one commentator noted:
[Aftermarket performance] can serve as a proxy for the investment
bank's credibility with investors and the perceived ability of the firm to
provide and assess good opportunities. Investors will be more receptive
to transactions managed by an investment bank that has a history for
taking quality companies public. A solid track record of aftermarket
performance gives the investment bank's sales force a substantial advan-
tage. 
149
In sum, investment banks seek to underwrite those offerings that will
prove profitable to both themselves and their investor clientele. By
achieving that goal, investment banks will increase their reputational
capital and consistently be able to go back to their clientele with future of-
ferings. All this leaves the vast majority of SIPO issuers without under-
writers for their offerings. With the advent of the Internet and related
technologies, however, this is not the problem it once was.
145. See Hambrecht & Quist, supra note 144, at 402. In fact, "[m]ost major bracket investment
banks will not manage IPOs less than $15 million." Id. at 409.
146. As some commentators have stated:
It is theoretically possible for a company to sell its stock directly to the public ("self-
underwrite") without the use of a conventional underwriter or professional intermediary.
Some entrepreneurs approach the going public process with a high degree of confidence that
they can locate investors directly. As a practical matter, however, it is extremely difficult,
absent unusual circumstances, to have a successful public offering of significant size without
the participation of professional underwriters.
SCHNEIDER Er AL., supra note 47, at 13. See also Levingston, supra note 14 (discussing Annie's
Homegrown, a company that "balked at using expensive Wall Street underwriters in pinstripes,"
electing instead to "[sell] the shares 'direct' to the public").
147. Recall that reporting companies cannot issue securities under either Regulation A or Rule
504. See 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.251(a)(2), .504(a)(l).
148. See SCHNEIDER ET AL., supra note 47, at 9 ("There are some small and speculative offerings
for which the trick is to find any underwriter .. "). See also infra text accompanying notes 172-73
(discussing targeting of institutions and high net worth retail investors by underwriters attempting to
sell securities).
149. Hambrecht & Quist, supra note 144, at 406. See also GOING PUBLIC, supra note 144, at 5;
FRANKLIN A. GEVuRTZ, BusINEss PLANNING 525-26 (2d ed. 1995).
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A. WHAT INVESTMENT BANKS ADD TO THE MIX
Services that underwriters provide can be broken down into the fol-
lowing four categories: merit review, due diligence, suitability, and after-
market support. 150 As described below, these services play an instrumen-
tal role in the protection of investors. Because these services are not
performed to the same extent in the self-managed SIPOs context, unso-
phisticated retail investors targeted by SIPO issuers confront serious risks
not faced by investors participating in traditional underwritten offerings.
Perhaps the most important service that an underwriter performs is a
cold-hearted review of the merits of a proposed offering: Should the se-
curities of this particular issuer be offered to the public in the first in-
stance? An underwriter's merit review is crucial because, except in spe-
cific instances,151 the SEC is prohibited from reviewing the merits of a
proposed offering. 152 In addition, this merit review is important because
many investors buy securities based wholly or partially on the reputation
of the investment bank underwriting the offering. 153 In other words, these
investors bet on the jockey rather than the horse.
Unlike the merit review performed by the state blue sky administra-
tors of certain states, 154 the merit review performed by underwriters cen-
150. While not the focus of this Article, it is important to note the multidimensional sales func-
tion performed by investment banks. This ranges from knowing who the customers are and how to
contact them to socializing rough-edged entrepreneurs for their public capital-raising debut. For an
excellent discussion of the socialization aspects of the underwriting process, see Langevoort, supra
note 26, at 16-18. See also Comment Letter from Perry L. Taylor, Jr., Chairman, Capital Markets
Committee of the Securities Industry Association, to Jonathan G. Katz, SEC Secretary, § 2 (Sept. 19,
1995) (discussing the filtering role provided by investment banks in the IPO process).
151. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 77g(b) (1994); 17 C.F.R. § 230.419 (relating to offerings by "blank
check" companies).
152. According to one commentator:
After considerable debate, Congress decided not to follow the pattern of the state [securities]
acts and eschewed the idea of a merit approach, opting instead for a system of full disclo-
sure. The theory behind the federal [securities law] framework is that investors are ade-
quately protected if all relevant aspects of the securities being marketed are fully and fairly
disclosed. The reasoning is that full disclosure provides investors with sufficient opportu-
nity to evaluate the merits of an investment and fend for themselves. It is a basic tenet of
federal securities regulation that investors' ability to make their own evaluations of available
investments obviates any need ... for the more costly and time-consuming governmental
merit analysis of the securities being offered.
HA7_N, supra note 33, § 1.2, at 7.
153. See Stephen P. Ferris, Janine S. Heller, Glenn A. Wolfe & Elizabeth S. Cooperman, An
Analysis and Recommendation for Prestigious Underwriter Participation in IPOs, 17 J. CORP. L. 581,
584 (1992) ("The participation of a particular underwriter gives a 'seal of approval' to buyers who
may not be familiar with the company that is going public, but who are familiar with the underwriter
and its reputation.").
154. See infra text accompanying notes 183-84.
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ters around profit: Will the proposed offering prove profitable to both the
underwriter and its investor clientele, 155 most of which are highly sophisti-
cated institutional investors? These twin profitability goals are closely in-
tertwined. Indeed, if the issuer, its offering, and its prospects for the future
are not initially appealing to investors, the underwriter may not be able to
place the issue and collect its commission. Once the deal is sold, a poor
showing of the securities in the aftermarket can drain the underwriter's
reputational capital and its ability to place additional securities with its in-
vestor clientele in the future. By favoring issuers with good business sto-
ries that currently have "sustainable revenues and consistent operating
margins,"' 156 investment banks prevent many unseasoned issuers from infil-
trating the IPO gene pool. Issuers, of course, valiantly try to convince the
banks that they indeed are ready for prime time. 157
Underwriters are also prodded into protecting investors by the in ter-
rorem effect of section 11(a) of the Securities Act.158 That section im-
poses liability on underwriters for material misstatements and omissions in
registration statements. According to one commentator:
[This liability is] based on the premise that an underwriter is in a unique
relationship with the issuer and can act as the devil's advocate to pres-
sure the issuer for adequate and truthful disclosure. If the underwriter
155. Before a particular offering is given the green light, a team of investment bankers will per-
form a thorough review of the issuer's financial condition and operating prospects. Typically, one or
more team members will discuss the merits of the offering with the underwriting committee of the
investment banking firm. PaineWebber Incorporated, for example, has an underwriting committee
that must give its approval before the firm can participate as an underwriter for a given offering. See
Telephone Interview with Dan Mittman, First Vice President and Associate General Counsel, Invest-
ment Banking Division of PaineWebber Incorporated (Mar. 27, 1998).
156. Hambrecht & Quist, supra note 144, at 400. Hambrecht & Quist adds that: "The company
should first consider whether it is indeed ready to go public. The more predictable a company's re-
sults of operations, the more 'ready' it is for an IPO." Id.
Another factor that an investment bank will examine is whether a prospective issuer is the type
of company with which it can establish a long-term business relationship. An investment bank hopes
that the issuer will direct additional business to it in the future, such as secondary offering underwrit-
ings or tender offer management.
157. As one commentator has noted:
If the company is a so-called start-up company, has no prior history of eamings or, for vari-
ous reasons, may be considered speculative, it may be unable to obtain an underwriter to sell
its securities. If it succeeds in finding an underwriter, the underwriter may not have suffi-
cient capital to handle a firm [commitment] underwriting and probably will insist on a so-
called best-efforts underwriting.
BLOOMENTHAL, supra note 40, § 6.01, at 363.
158. Securities Act section 11 (a) states:
In case any part of the registration statement, when such part became effective, contained an
untrue statement of a material fact or omitted to state a material fact required to be stated
therein or necessary to make the statements therein not misleading, any person acquiring
such security ... may... sue... [e]very underwriter with respect to such security.
15 U.S.C. § 77k(a) (1994 & Supp. III 1997).
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does not agree with the information in the registration statement, it can
refuse to proceed with the sale.
159
Underwriters can avoid this liability by proving the affirmative defense of
"due diligence" under section 11(b) of the Securities Act. 16  To do so,
they and their legal counsel must have conducted an often painstaking
double check of the disclosure contained in a registration statement.
161 If
the underwriters fail to adequately perform their role as gatekeepers of
informational veracity, disgruntled investors can sue them for damages. 1
62
Underwriters also perform a suitability function that helps protect in-
vestors. As described in greater detail below, 163 "suitability" in this con-
text refers to the determination of whether a particular security is right for
a given investor. Because "[m]ost, if not all, underwriters of any securities
offering will generally be members of the [NASD], ' ' 4 their sales efforts
will be subject to the NASD Conduct Rules. 165 One of these rules requires
any broker-dealer who recommends the purchase, sale, or exchange of a
security to a client to ensure that the recommendation is suitable for that
client, given the client's financial status, tax status, investment objectives,
and other pertinent information. 166 Members of the underwriting syndicate
and selling group for a particular offering must make suitability determi-
159. Ferris et al., supra note 153, at 584 (citation omitted).
160. Securities Act section 11 (b) states:
Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (a) no person, other than the issuer, shall be li-
able as provided therein who shall sustain the burden of proof... [t]hat: (A) as regards any
part of the registration statement not purporting to be made on the authority of an ex-
pert, ... he had, after reasonable investigation, reasonable ground to believe and did be-
lieve ... that the statements therein were true and that there was no omission to state a ma-
terial fact required to be stated therein or necessary to make the statements therein not
misleading ....
15 U.S.C. § 77k(b).
161. For a description of the due diligence review process, see generally GARY M. LAWRENCE,
DUE DILIGENCE IN BUSINESS TRANSACMIONS (1997). The seminal cases discussing the due diligence
defense include Feit v. Leasco Data Processing Equipment Corp., 332 F. Supp. 544 (E.D.N.Y. 1971);
and Escott v. BarChris Construction Corp., 283 F. Supp. 643 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
162. See 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a)(5). Performing due diligence also helps preserve an underwriter's
reputational capital. As explained by one commentator:
Financial intermediaries ... have reputations to protect as repeat players in the capital mar-
ketplace. They may suffer in terms of future business if they attest to the quality of the is-
suer and fraud is later discovered. Thus, they take steps to investigate before associating.
Recognizing this, investors are more likely to rely on the disclosures when a reputable in-
termediary is involved, and hence demand less of a risk premium.
Langevoort, supra note 26, at 14.
163. See infra text accompanying notes 195-96.
164. HAZEN, supra note 33, § 2.1, at 77.
165. See NASD MANUAL CONDUCr RULES at 4101 (National Ass'n of Sec. Dealers, Inc. 1996).
166. See id. IM-2310-2 (discussing Conduct Rule 2310); 17 C.F.R. § 240.15g-1 (1998); 17




nations whenever they recommend the securities being offered to their cli-
entele. Those determinations, however, are not required when a particular
customer unilaterally places an order for those securities.
Finally, lead underwriters protect investors by providing aftermarket
support services. Indeed, many issuers choose an underwriter based on its
ability to provide this support.167 Members of the firm of Hambrecht &
Quist described this support in the following way:
In the aftermarket, the managing underwriters of the IPO will usually
provide services for the company through their research, sales and trad-
ing departments. The research department of each managing under-
writer will write and distribute periodic reports which provide an
evaluation of the company's stock as an investment through an analysis
of the company's performance and detailed projections for the com-
pany's near-term operating results. Such reports target an audience of
institutional investors, brokers and the financial press. Active and effec-
tive research coverage can affect the stock price of a company by
stimulating buying demand or selling interest. For companies going
public on the NASDAQ market, the sales and trading departments of the
managing underwriters will devote resources to market making activi-
ties. For a substantial period of time after the offering, the managing
underwriters will be the most active participants in the trading of the
stock. The managing underwriters' familiarity and relationship with the
major buyers and sellers of the stock and their active market making
provide increased support for the stock.
168
Thus, the aftermarket support provided by an underwriter provides a vital
service to both the issuer and investors that is generally absent in a self-
managed SIPO.
B. THE INABILITY OF UNPREFERRED RETAIL INVESTORS TO PARTICIPATE
MEANINGFULLY IN UNDERWRITTEN IPOs
Unpreferred retail investors have long sought to participate in IPOs
underwritten by mainstream investment banks but have met with little suc-
cess. 169 These investors' appetite for IPO shares has only grown during
167. See Hambrecht & Quist, supra note 144, at 404.
168. Id. at 405. See also SCHNEIDER ET AL., supra note 47, at 12 (discussing aftermarket support
generally).
169. As explained by Wit Capital:
In traditional Initial Public Offerings, corporate issuers sell shares to underwriters who resell
the shares to institutions and very wealthy individuals. Many of these buyers in turn hope to
profit by quickly 'flipping' the shares to ordinary individual investors and smaller institu-
tions.
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the unprecedented bull market of the 1990s. Unfortunately, "[i]t is no
news that underwriters make most of the shares in hot IPOs available not
to the little-guy investor but to institutions, such as mutual-fund companies
and pension funds, that provide a lot of trading commissions and other
business."' 170 Those individuals that do succeed in participating in a hot
IPO often are coerced by underwriters into a buy and hold strategy while
institutions remain free "to dump hot new stocks at their whim, often
within hours or minutes of the stock's first trade."'17' Accordingly, the
Aided by brokers who actively promote new issues to their individual investor customers,
the process generally works well for underwriters and their preferred customers: The average
IPO rises 18 percent in value in the first few hours of public trading.
But individual investors are virtually excluded from the rewards. They rarely get to buy
shares at the offering price. Moreover, when they do buy in the secondary market, they have
to pay brokerage commissions.
Retail When asked about retail distribution, underwriters often agree to distribute 15
to 25 percent of a deal to individual investors through traditional retail brokerage.
Notwithstanding the good intentions of their capital markets professionals, however,
the major firms have never been able to discipline branch office managers or powerful
brokers.
The result is always the same: shares allocated for retail wind up in the accounts of very
wealthy, preferred investors intent on flipping.
Wit Capital Home Page, Raising Capital (visited Dec. 2, 1997) <http://www.witcapital.coml
ibs/capital/ raise.html>.
An unpreferred retail investor's best chance to participate in a particular IPO occurs when (1)
subscriptions from an underwriter's traditional investor base (institutional investors and preferred re-
tail investors) are insufficient to sell all the shares in the IPO and/or (2) that investor's brokerage ac-
count is with the underwriter's broker-dealer division or subsidiary.
170. Michael Siconolfi, Underwriters Set Aside IPO Stock for Officials of Potential Customers,
WALL ST. J., Nov. 12, 1997, at Al. See also Celia & Stark, supra note 2, at 819 ("[S]mall investors
often remain out of luck when it comes to getting in on the hottest initial public offerings .... ");
Langevoort, supra note 26, at 25 ("The triple forces of technology, institutionalization and interna-
tionalization are rapidly creating markets for securities beyond the direct reach of smaller investors,
and segmenting those to which the smaller investor does have access."); Briefly, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 29,
1996, at D2 (citing research of the National Council of Individual Investors that revealed that small
investors were denied the opportunity to earn profits of up to $1.1 billion in 1995 because they were
shut out of IPOs); Rebecca Buckman, More On-Line Brokers Seek Access to IPOs, WALL ST. J., July
21, 1998, at C1 ("Mhe best [IPO] deals are usually reserved for powerful institutional investors.");
Deborah Lohse, PO Market Still Cooking, But with a Lack of Sizzle, WALL ST. J., Nov. 17, 1997, at
Cl (in discussing the quick rise or "pop" in IPO share prices by 15% or more in their first trading day,
Lohse argues "[tihat pop is rarely available to small individual investors, who aren't invited into the
ground floor of most quality IPOs.").
171. Michael Siconolifi & Patrick McGeehan, Wall Street Brokers Press Small Investors to Hold
IPO Shares, WAL. ST. J., June 26, 1998, at Al. Underwriters pressure retail investors indirectly by
punishing those brokers whose retail clientele flip IPO shares. In such cases, underwriters often take
away brokerage commissions from those brokers. Brokers in general, therefore, have a strong incen-
tive to exclude those retail investors likely to flip shares from participating in IPOs in the first place.
Wit Capital, by contrast, directly penalizes its customers who flip IPO shares within 60 days of
purchase. It does so by maintaining a rating score for each customer that tracks that customer's record
for buying and holding public offering shares. Customers who flip shares score negative points and
thus reduce the likelihood that they will obtain shares in subsequent public offerings. See Wit Capital
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typical unpreferred retail investor's hope is that one of the mutual funds in
which she may own shares will purchase shares in quality IPOs.
The bias against the unpreferred retail investor is not really a bias at
all. It is simply a recognition by the investment banking community as to
which side of their bread is buttered and, more importantly, who holds the
butter knife. Underwriters consistently go back to the same investors to
sell the securities they underwrite. These investors are institutional inves-
tors and "preferred" retail investors.172 Underwriters also favor individu-
als in decisionmaking roles at potential clients. 173 Because these investors
frequently participate in offerings that are undersubscribed, investment
banks often reward them by including them in oversubscribed offerings.
Simply stated, the typical unpreferred retail customer is not given the op-
portunity to buy shares in a hot IPO because that customer was nowhere to
be found when shares in more mundane offerings were previously sold.
Some efforts have been made to include more unpreferred retail in-
vestors in underwritten IPOs. For example, Fidelity Brokerage Services,
Inc. ("Fidelity") recently formed an exclusive strategic alliance with Salo-
mon Smith Barney Holdings, Inc. ("Salomon") to offer Fidelity customers
access to IPOs and secondary offerings underwritten in a lead manager ca-
pacity by Salomon. 174 According to Fidelity, "[tihis arrangement [with
Salomon] makes Fidelity Brokerage the first discount broker to offer their
customers new issue equity securities of significant size and number."'
175
Home Page, Wit Capital Rules & Procedures (visited Dec. 1, 1998) <http://www.witcapital.
com/rules/purchase.html#flipsec>.
172. Institutional investors include, among others, investment companies (mutual funds), banks,
retirement plans, and insurance companies. "Preferred" retail investors typically include individuals
qualifying as "accredited investors" due to their high net worths and/or income levels. See 17 C.F.R.
§ 230.501(a)(5)-(6) (1998) (setting forth the accredited investor standard for natural persons for pur-
poses of Regulation D).
Because these investors, particularly institutional investors, generally subscribe for large blocks
of securities, underwriters who sell to these investors achieve certain efficiencies that are not realized
when selling to unpreferred retail investors. As some commentators have noted: "[Unstitutional inves-
tors often will pay a higher price than retail investors for securities of a company with highly favor-
able prospects if the institutional investors are able to purchase securities in sufficient quantity."
SCHNEIDER ET AL., supra note 47, at 8.
173. See Michael Siconolfi, Unexpected Turn: The Issue of 'Spinning' Ended Merrill's Interest
in Hambrecht & Quist, WALL ST. J., Feb. 13, 1998, at Al ("Spinning occurs when an underwriter al-
locates IPO shares to the personal brokerage account of a corporate or venture-capital executive-
shares often sold, or 'spun,' for quick profit-in a possible bid [for] future business from the execu-
tive's company.").
174. See FIDELITY BROKERAGE SERVS., INC., INITIAL PUBLIC OFFERINGS AND SECONDARY
OFFERINGS: ADDED ADVANTAGES FOR THE FIDELITY BROKERAGE ACCOUNT (1997) (brochure on file
with author) [hereinafter FIDELITY IPO BROCHURE].
175. Id.
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By acting as a selling group member of an offering underwritten and lead-
managed by Salomon, Fidelity generates commissions under the alliance
when it sells securities to its customers.
176
Others, too, have jumped on the IPO bandwagon. 177 Discount broker
Charles Schwab & Company ("Schwab") recently entered into an ar-
rangement with three underwriters, JP Morgan, Hambrecht & Quist, and
CS First Boston, allowing certain Schwab brokerage customers access to
IPO shares in offerings managed by one of those underwriters. Access,
however, is restricted to brokerage customers maintaining high balances
and/or executing a specified number of trades. 178 Because of these strings,
the Schw;ab plan offers the true unpreferred retail investor nothing more
than the cold shoulder he already knows all too well.
While some of these efforts are helpful to unpreferred retail investors,
they are unlikely to change in any material way the financial benefits that
underwriters reap by presenting offerings first and foremost to their tradi-
tional client base. All of this, of course, plays very nicely into the hands of
SIPO issuers planning Internet offerings. As Joseph Cella and John Stark
have noted:
The entrepreneur, the inventor, and the small business owner now have a
cheap and efficient alternative means to reach millions of potential inter-
ested parties without the expense of a road show, without hiring the
usual cadre of lawyers and financial advisers, without hiring a printing
service, and, most of all, without leaving the house. 179
In turn, these "potential interested parties"-read "unpreferred retail
176. See id.
177. See Buckman, supra note 170. Not surprisingly, Wit Capital has taken the most aggressive
role in attempting to include unpreferred retail customers in quality IPOs. "[Wit Capital] offer[s] in-
dividual investors unprecedented first come, first serve access to investment opportunities and services
Wall Street has long denied to individuals, such as IPOs of major underwriters at the offering price
and venture capital offerings." E-mail from Wit Capital <alex@witcapital.com> to the Jeffrey J. Hass
<jhass@nyls.edu> entitled "Wit Capital Update-Unprecedented Investment Opportunities" (Sept.
16, 1997) (on file with author). Wit Capital's experiment, however, has apparently met with mixed
results. See Truell, supra note 10; Buckman, supra note 170. Lately, the demand for IPO shares dis-
tributed by Wit Capital has far outstripped the supply, leaving many of Wit Capital's customers with
no shares at all. See E-mail from Wit Capital <NewlssueAlert@witcapital.com> to Jeffrey J. Hass
<jhass@nyls.edu> entitled "New Issue Allocation" (Feb. 16, 1999) (on file with author).
178. Shares can be accessed by either Schwab 500 investors (those who engage in a minimum of
four trades per month and have an account balance of at least $50,000 in equity) or Schwab Priority
Gold investors (those who have a minimum account balance of $1 million but are not required to en-
gage in a minimum amount of trades). See Telephone Interview with Paul Bishop, Broker at Charles
Schwab & Co. (March 3, 1998). See also Buckman, supra note 170 ("[A]t discount firms that do get
some [IPO] shares, such as Schwab, Fidelity and E*Trade, demand for the deals generally far exceeds
supply. And often, only such firms' best customers are eligible.").
179. Celia & Stark, supra note 2, at 816.
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investors"-are turning to the Internet "as a place where they can discover
that golden investment opportunity." 180 They are anxious to learn about
any IPO in the hope of getting in on the ground floor. Exacerbating this
problem "is the remarkably benevolent culture and trustworthy nature of
Internet users." 181  Because these offerings are almost always self-
managed, however, these investors receive few of the crucial investor
protections provided by underwriters in the context of a traditional
underwritten offering.
IlI. SUITABILITY AND THE RETAIL INVESTOR
When addressing the relationship between suitability and the retail
investor, important questions must be answered. What exactly does
"suitability" mean in this context? How does suitability differ from the
concepts of merit review and full disclosure, two other mainstays of inves-
tor protection? These questions are important because if suitability con-
cems are already fully addressed by those other concepts, then nothing
needs to be done to regulate self-managed SIPOs conducted over the Inter-
net by unseasoned companies. If, however, those concerns are not fully
addressed, then the SEC should adopt appropriate regulatory changes.
A. MERIT REVIEW, FULL DISCLOSURE, AND SUITABILITY
"Merit review" is a particularly subjective concept that varies depend-
ing on the specific standards employed by the individual or entity perform-
ing the review. A review of an offering's merits may be made by either a
financial intermediary, a state blue sky administrator, or both, depending
on the type of offering in question. Of course investors, including unpre-
ferred retail investors, conduct their own merit review when determining
whether to purchase a particular issuer's securities. While many investors
are in a position to "fend for themselves" upon receipt of full and fair dis-
closure about an issuer and its offering, many cannot. It is with respect to
these vulnerable investors that suitability concerns arise.
As seen earlier in this Article, prospective underwriters review the
merits of an offering in order to determine whether the offering makes fi-
nancial sense for themselves and their investor clientele. 182 By contrast,
state blue sky administrators who review the merits of an offering subjec-
tively review that offering to determine whether or not it meets "a mini-
180. Id. at 816-17.
181. Id. at 827.
182. See supra text accompanying notes 151-57.
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mum level of fairness."' 83 These administrators "speak for the average in-
vestor in good faith" in order to ensure that an offering is initially worthy
of any investor's consideration, much less any specific investor's consid-
eration. 184 In either case, the focus of the reviewer is always on character-
istics relating to the issuer and the offering, rather than on those relating to
a particular investor.
Full disclosure-the target at which the federal securities laws are
primarily aimed185-is also a concept unconcerned about the characteris-
tics of a particular investor. Like merit review, full disclosure is issuer-
and offering-specific. Unlike merit review, full disclosure operates on the
premise that each and every offering is meritorious, no matter how specu-
lative or complex, so long as investors have adequate and truthful disclo-
sure about the offering and its issuer upon which to base their investment
decisions. 186 Once full disclosure is made, "it is not within the prerogative
of the [SEC] to prevent a financial product from coming to the market-
place."'18 7 Indeed, "[t]he SEC's mandate is to provide protection through
disclosure."'188 Once investors have been supplied with full disclosure,
they are left to fend for themselves-to decide based on that information
whether or not to invest. 189
In essence then, full disclosure rests squarely on the noble proposition
that, from an investing perspective, "all persons are created equal." Give
investors the information they need, preferably in a readable format, 190 and
183. Manning Gilbert Warren III, Legitimacy in the Securities Industry: The Role of Merit
Regulation, 53 BROOK. L. REV. 129, 136 (1987). See also SCHNEIDER ET AL., supra note 47, at 25
(while state standards vary, each generally requires an offering to be "fair, just and equitable"); Cheryl
T. Farson, At What Cost Paternalism? A Call to State Legislatures to Reconsider the Propriety of
Merit Review of Securities Offerings, 22 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 963, 963 (1990) (arguing that, while there is no
universally accepted definition of "merit review," many merit standards require offerings to be fair,
just, and equitable).
184. Warren, supra note 183, at 137. According to one commentator:
[Blue sky] statutes emerge from the basic assumption that, without regulation, investors are
unable to make intelligent investment decisions. This assumption is based on three factors.
First, the average investor does not have access to information and relies on the issuer or un-
derwriter for material information regarding the offering. Second, information available to
the underwriter is so complex that even sophisticated analysts find risk assessment difficult.
Third, average investors, if provided with the information, are incapable of properly evaluat-
ing the material facts necessary for determining an investment's merit.
Farson, supra note 183, at 965-66.
185. See North Star Int'l v. Arizona Corp. Comm., 720 F.2d 578, 582-83 (9th Cir. 1983).
186. See SCHNEIDER ET AL., supra note 47, at 25.
187. Roberta S. Karmel, Blue-Sky Merit Regulation: Benefit to Investors or Burden on Com-
merce?, 53 BROOK. L. REV. 105, 117 (1987).
188. Warren, supra note 183, at 136.
189. See SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMM'N, THE WORK OFTHE SEC 3-4 (1986).
190. The SEC now requires issuers to write their prospectuses and other offering materials in
"plain English" and with a minimum of legalese. See Securities Act Rule 421(b), (d), 17 C.F.R.
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they will be able to make informed investment decisions. Because invest-
ing IQs and financial circumstances vary widely from person to person,
however, this proposition is highly suspect. 191 It is a little like saying that
anyone who reads through the owner's manual for a sophisticated four-
head VCR with toggle control magically will be able to edit and dub his
own home movies. The irony of all this is that not even the SEC itself has
complete faith in a system based on full disclosure. 192 One need not look
any further than the "purchaser" sophistication requirement in Securities
Act Rule 50619 and the SEC's own suitability rule for penny stocks1 94 for
evidence of this.
Unlike the concepts of merit review and full disclosure, suitability is
an inherently investor-specific concept. In fact, the NASD's suitability
rule is referred to as the "Know Your Customer Rule."'195 While a particu-
lar investment may be suitable for Investor A, it may be totally unsuitable
for Investor B. In this instance, it is not the particular offering, issuer, or
disclosure that has changed, but rather the identity of the investor. Thus,
the suitability of an investment is measured against the fundamental char-
acteristics of a particular investor. The characteristics of the particular of-
§ 230.432(b), (d) (1998); Regulation S-K, Items 501-503, 17 C.F.R. §§ 229.501-.503; Plain English
Disclosures, Securities Act Release No. 7497, [1997 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
86,003, at 80,125 (Jan. 28, 1998); Plain English Disclosures, Securities Act Release No. 7380, [1997
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 85,879, at 88,902 (Jan. 14, 1997). See also
BLOOMENTHAL, supra note 40, § 5.03[3] (explaining, by example, the SEC's Plain English Initiative);
J. Peder Zane, For Investors, an Initial Public Offering of English, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 25, 1996, § 3, at
7 (discussing how the Plain English Initiative will affect mutual fund prospectus disclosure).
191. Indeed, Professor Langevoort questions the "self-protective ability" of even certain accred-
ited investors, particularly those whose high incomes are derived from activities requiring no financial
acumen. See Langevoort, supra note 26, at 22-23. He calls for empirical work in this area, speculat-
ing that "our traditional form of regulation-mandatory disclosure-[may add] less value than we
think, precisely because other influences dominate the decision-making process." Id. at 23.
192. Former SEC Commissioner Francis M. wlheat comments in his report (Wheat Report) to his
SEC colleagues:
At what audience should disclosure be aimed? Is the literature elicited by the Commission's
requirements intended primarily to aid the unsophisticated? Is it, on the contrary, designed
to assist the assiduous student of finance who searches for every clue to the intrinsic value of
securities? Or should the Commission strive to meet the needs of the hypothetical
"reasonable" investor of "reasonable" sophistication?
Throughout its history, the Commission has struggled with these questions. They may well
be unanswerable. A balance must be struck which reflects, to the extent possible, the needs
of all who have a stake in the securities markets.
U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMM'N, DISCLOSURE TO INVESTORS: A REAPPRAISAL OF
ADMINISTRATIVE POLICIES UNDER THE '33 AND '34 ACTS 51-52 (1969).
193. 17 C.F.R. § 230.506(b)(2)(ii).
194. See infra Part IV.A.2 (discussing Exchange Act Rule 15g-9, 17 C.F.R. § 240.15g-9).
195. See infra Part IV.A.I (discussing NASD MANUAL CONDUCr RULE 2310 (National Ass'n of
Sec. Dealers, Inc. 1996) (Recommendations to Customers (Suitability))).
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fering and its issuer are only important in determining whether they com-
port with a particular investor's financial profile.
The suitability of a particular investment for a given investor is a
function of that investor's financial objectives, sophistication, and
wherewithal. If the investment does not fit with all three, then the invest-
ment is not suitable for the investor. An investor's financial objectives are
important because an investment should only be chosen if it could help
achieve them. 196 Financial sophistication, by contrast, tests whether a par-
ticular investor truly understands the risks and rewards of a given invest-
ment and how they compare with those of alternative investments. With-
out the requisite amount of sophistication, an investor will be unable to
determine whether a particular investment will help meet his financial ob-
jectives. Financial wherewithal focuses on the ability of a particular inves-
tor to lose some or all of his investment, and thus it is based on an inves-
tor's current and anticipated financial condition.
To illustrate the importance of these three elements of investor suit-
ability, assume an investor in question is a young, newly-minted MBA in
finance who just started her first full-time job. She is loaded down with
student loans and has little savings. Her financial objective, which is to
achieve maximum capital appreciation, has led her to consider shares in a
risky high-tech company listed on the Small Cap section of Nasdaq.
At first glance, the investment appears suited to her. The investment
clearly meets her financial objective. From a financial sophistication
standpoint, she should be able to understand the risks and rewards of the
investment based on her education. However, given her limited savings
and her substantial monthly student loan payments, the investment appears
unsuitable from a financial wherewithal perspective. Indeed, due to the
investment's illiquidity, she may be unable to monetize her investment as
quickly as needed. In addition, a total loss of her investment could wipe
out a large portion of her limited savings.
B. THE NEED FOR SUITABILITY DETERMINATIONS ARISES
For the reasons discussed below, substantial policy grounds now exist
for requiring unseasoned issuers involved in self-managed SIPOs to make
suitability determinations prior to consummating sales of securities to un-
196. For example, a risky high-tech stock issued by an unseasoned issuer would not support the
financial objectives of an elderly investor who is seeking a steady stream of income. By contrast, that
stock could fit perfectly with the financial objectives of a younger investor with a steady income who
is seeking maximum capital appreciation.
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sophisticated retail investors. Later in this Article, the author proposes a
specific federal suitability standard to help protect investors involved in
those offerings. 197 The purpose of this section, however, is to discuss why
suitability determinations are warranted today in the context of self-
managed SIPOs when they were not in the past.
Simply put, suitability determinations designed to protect unsophisti-
cated retail investors are needed because technological developments have
altered the financing "roadmap" traditionally followed by most growing
businesses. Indeed, a growing business historically satisfied its need for
capital by following a well-trodden financing path from which it was diffi-
cult, if not impossible, to deviate. A business began by raising money first
from a hierarchy of private sources and, much later in its growth cycle,
from public sources. 198 As the business followed this roadmap, over time
it would achieve certain financial and business milestones relating to reve-
nue and market share among other things. The achievement of each mile-
stone would result in a step down in risk associated with the business. As
one prominent accounting firm has noted, "[A]s a company demonstrates
its ability to achieve various goals, its probability of succeeding increases
and its danger of failing decreases.... In exchange for the reduction in
risk, [the business] can negotiate higher prices per share in each successive
round [of financing.]"' 199
The initial private sources of financing for new businesses historically
came from localized sources. First, an entrepreneur would look in her own
pocket and/or tap friends and family sympathetic to the business or, more
likely, to the entrepreneur herself. 200 If the business had significant collat-
eral-worthy assets and/or the entrepreneur herself had wealth sufficient to
support a personal guarantee, then the entrepreneur would also approach
197. See infra Part IV.B.
198. Fidelity has described this roadmap in the following terms:
The road to public ownership often begins with an entrepreneur who has developed an idea
for a product or service and borrows enough money to launch a start-up business. If the
company grows, the entrepreneur can get funds for expansion from the private equity mar-
ket. Investors then pull together pools of money, referred to as venture capital. If a com-
pany finds its product or service in great demand, it quickly outstrips the ability of venture
capitalists to provide money for rapid growth. That's when it may decide to go public.
FIDELITY IPO BROCHURE, supra note 174.
199. DELOrITE & ToucHE, RAISING VENTURE CAPITAL 52-53 (1982).
200. See GOING PUBLIC, supra note 144, at 6.
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local financial institutions for a loan.211 She might also have been success-
ful in convincing a local "angel" to supply equity capital to the business.
20 2
Soon, however, these businesses' need for capital outgrew localized
sources of private financing. At their next stage of development, they
traditionally did not raise capital from public sources. The expense and
red tape involved with public offerings and the difficulty of attracting in-
vestment banks to underwrite small offerings made public financing unap-
pealing at this stage.213  Growing businesses, therefore, raised capital by
privately placing their equity securities with venture capital firms and
other institutional investors.
Capital raised from these sources was costly. Because venture capital
firms and other institutions were highly sophisticated and had a keen un-
derstanding of the risk-reward calculus, they demanded sizable equity
positions at low prices per share in return for providing needed capital.
Frequently, they demanded additional control over the management of the
company.2°4 Indeed, in their view the acceptance of the significant risks
associated with young, growing businesses was only warranted when the
rewards received were commensurate.
20 5
Once private sources of capital were outstripped or the amount of
needed capital warranted the incurrence of the expenses associated with a
public offering, growing businesses turned to the public capital markets.
In doing so, businesses either could solicit the aid of one or more financial
intermediaries to act as underwriters, or conduct direct or self-managed of-
ferings. Although issuers that conducted self-managed offerings benefited
by keeping more of the offering proceeds, most issuers sought underwrit-
ers for their offerings. As one commentator has noted, self-managed offer-
ings were "especially rare because most issuers [did] not have the
wherewithal or expertise in the financial industry to handle a public offer-
201. See Fisch, supra note 125, at 60-61.
202. See id. at 62 (explaining that business "[a]ngels are high net worth individual investors who
provide private equity financing to firms on an informal basis and typically a smaller scale than ven-
ture capital investments").
203. See supra text accompanying notes 142-49.
204. See GOING PUBLIC, supra note 144, at 6. See generally Theresa A. Gabaldon, Love and
Money: An Affinity-Based Model for the Regulation of Capital Fornation by Small Business, 2 J.
SMALL & EMERGING Bus. L. 259 (1998) (discussing friends and family financing and, in connection
therewith, proposing a new fiduciary-based exemption to securities registration).
205. But see Fisch, supra note 125, at 62-63, 83 (arguing that while "the cost of venture capital
funds is considered high [by many observers],. . . the managerial services provided by venture capital-
ists are rarely reflected in this assessment"; and that "[i]nformation costs, higher risk, and the possi-
bility of fraud all offer explanations why the high cost of small business capital may be an appropriate
response to market conditions rather than evidence of a market failure").
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ing., 20 6 In other words, they did not have the ability to "stimulate investor
interest"207 to the same extent as members of the investment banking
community.
Most self-managed offerings that were completed were pitched di-
rectly to existing security holders or institutional investors, "thus eliminat-
ing the necessity for a promotional or retailing sales effort. '208 Both these
groups of investors were either already familiar with the issuers in ques-
tion and/or were sophisticated enough to protect themselves. Thus, due to
the paucity of self-managed offerings in general, and the even smaller
number that were directed to retail investors in particular, the issue of
whether these offerings were suitable for retail investors historically did
not exist for all intents and purposes.
Technological developments, however, have changed this dramati-
cally. Indeed, today's young, growing businesses now have the ability lit-
erally to throw the traditional financing roadmap out the window. These
developments, particularly the Internet and e-mail, have made it possible
for these businesses to make a financial quantum leap from the friends and
family financing stage directly to the public offering financing stage with-
out skipping a beat. The ramifications of this progression are tremendous.
First, small businesses have the ability to bypass entirely the venture
capital/institutional investor stage of private financing.209 This is the fi-
nancing stage that proves so costly to small businesses in terms of having
to sell large equity stakes at low prices per share. Now through these new
technologies, without any step down in risk, SIPO issuers can sell smaller
equity chunks to members of the IPO-hungry general public. Indeed, un-
like venture capitalists and institutions, geographically dispersed members
of the public generally lack the sophistication and negotiating power to
demand rewards commensurate with the risks they are accepting.210 Fre-
quently the prices per share that Regulation A issuers require investors to
pay for their stock are literally pulled out of thin air.211 By contrast, IPO
206. HAZEN, supra note 33, § 2.1, at 73.
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. See generally Langevoort, supra note 26, at 3 n.5 (noting that the dependence on venture
capital financing will be reduced as direct distributions of securities become more efficient).
210. As one commentator has pointed out, "Unlike institutions and most 'accredited investors,'
many individual investors lack the information and experience to compare different types of offerings,
have no negotiating leverage, and rely extensively on securities salesmen eager to confirm sales."
Warren, supra note 183, at 137.
211. For example, the following was one of a total 21 risk factors listed in Spring Street Offering
Circular I:
Arbitrary Determination of Purchase Price
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prices in underwritten offerings are set by underwriters in consultation
with issuers and are based on a variety of factors, including among others
the trading prices of shares of comparable, publicly traded companies.
212
Second, these new technologies provide small businesses with un-
precedented "cold calling" access to millions of unsophisticated retail in-
vestors. Through e-mail, for example, issuers can easily target members of
the public who have already shown an affinity towards their products or
services. As if this were not enough, this access to the public is highly
cost-efficient. The costs of placing an offering circular on-line and prepar-
ing e-mail distribution lists are modest, and the actual cost of delivering
information on-line once this has been done is negligible.
213
Finally, these new technologies not only allow issuers to jump from
the friends and family financing stage to the public financing stage, but
they also enable issuers to reach the public without the assistance of un-
derwriters. While the proponents of disintermediation will undoubtedly
cheer this development, self-managed SIPOs lack substantially all the
protections associated with traditional underwritten offerings. In this re-
gard, the issuers themselves rather than experienced underwriters are de-
ciding whether they are ready to go public. Self-managed SIPOs also lack
the rigorous due diligence review performed by underwriters and their le-
gal counsel.214 In addition, because broker-dealers are not usually in-
volved, it is not necessary to make suitability determinations. Finally, lit-
The purchase price of the Shares was determined by the Company and does not necessarily
bear any relationship to the Company's asset value, net worth or other established criteria of
value. Each prospective investor should make an independent evaluation of the fairness of
such price....
SPRING STREET OFFERING CIRCULAR I, supra note 44, at 4. See also SPRING STREET OFFERING
CIRCULAR II, supra note 44, at 4 (listing virtually the same risk factor); Amendment No. 5 to Form I-
A of The Pathways Group, Inc., at 9, 13 (filed July 14, 1997) (stating in the offering circular that "the
offering price of the Common Stock is not necessarily related to the Company's asset value, net worth
or other criteria of value" and later that "the Subscription Price has been established arbitrarily by the
Board of the Company ... [and] [a]s such, should not be considered the actual value of the Shares").
212. As one group of commentators has pointed out:
The proposed initial public offering price reflects a variety of factors, including prevailing
market conditions, the results of operations of the company in recent periods, the type of
business it conducts, its future prospects, the stage of its development, and an assessment of
its management. The most important determination of price generally is the price-earnings
or EBITDA (earnings before... interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization) multiples of
other companies in the industry. Typically, a company will be valued at a slight discount
from established companies in its industry in order to provide an incentive to purchase the
stock being offered rather than that of the more established companies.
SCHNEIDER Er AL., supra note 47, at 11.
213. See Klein, supra note 1, at 90.
214. See Langevoort, supra note 26, at 20-21 (arguing that the loss of the disciplinary influence
of intermediaries on issuer disclosure "will involve a social cost; prima facie, we might need some
alternative strategy (for example, greater SEC or Blue Sky Law supervision) to offset it").
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tie if any aftermarket support will be available to assist current and future
investors.
In this new era, investor suitability concerns, which were largely non-
existent in the recent past, now loom large. Indeed, in the self-managed
SIPO context little stands between the fox and the chickens.215 The SEC,
of course, will help ensure that a given Regulation A offering circular
contains the streamlined disclosure required by Regulation A.216 In addi-
tion, state blue sky administrators in those states that conduct merit re-
views will help ensure that the terms of a particular offering meet their
own notions of fairness. Nevertheless, the fact remains that issuers en-
gaged in the most speculative offerings will be pitching their securities di-
rectly to the most vulnerable segment of the investing public.
To illustrate, take the case of an unseasoned issuer engaged in a
highly speculative business that decides to raise capital by selling common
stock in a self-managed Regulation A offering conducted over the Internet
and through e-mail. Assume that the issuer's offering materials fully
comply with Regulation A disclosure requirements and are otherwise
truthful and complete. Assume also that the offering was "blue-skyed" in
the states in which the issuer is offering the common stock. Clearly, for
many retail investors this risky, speculative offering will be perfectly well-
suited. Those investors have an appetite for this type of offering and are
sophisticated enough to understand the risks involved. They also under-
stand the financial loss they will incur if the issuer's business is not suc-
cessful. Most importantly, if the common stock becomes worthless, they
have the financial wherewithal to bear the loss.
This particular investment, however, will be ill-suited to many other
retail investors. Some of these investors simply will not understand the
risks and rewards of investing in the common stock of a speculative issuer.
For others the common stock will be inconsistent with their financial ob-
jectives. Still others will be unable to bear the financial repercussions of a
partial or total loss of their investment.
Leaving aside the issue of suitability for the moment, no investor,
based on the assumptions above, will have any legal recourse against ei-
ther the issuer or its principals in the event the common stock becomes
worthless. The issuer, after all, has made truthful and legally adequate
215. As Professor Langevoort has stated, "In the direct marketing program, what is lost most is
the regulatory oversight over selling practices." Id. at 21 (citation omitted).
216. See Coffee, supra note 27, at 1213 (arguing that the SEC could step in as the informational
gatekeeper with respect to direct issuer equity offerings if the SEC's role in regulating the offerings of
mature companies diminishes upon the adoption of a system of "company registration").
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disclosure about itself and the offering. Required filings at the federal and
state level have been made. Things simply did not work out the way the
issuer and the investors had hoped they would.
For those investors for whom the common stock was a suitable in-
vestment, this is an unfortunate but not totally unexpected turn of events.
They are sophisticated enough to understand that strikeouts occur much
more frequently than home runs. But for those investors for whom the
common stock was unsuitable, the decline in value of the common stock
they hold could be disastrous. They may be totally unprepared both men-
tally and financially for this result.
The best way to protect unsophisticated retail investors from unsuit-
able self-managed SIPO securities is to ensure that they do not purchase
them in the first place. In other words, make sure that those securities are
channeled only into the hands of retail investors capable of understanding
and dealing with the associated risks and consequences. However, any
channeling system must accomplish its goal of investor protection while
minimizing its impact on the ability of unseasoned issuers to raise capital
through self-managed SIPOs.
This author argues that a new federal suitability standard will both
enhance investor protection and foster capital formation by improving in-
vestors' perception of the legitimacy of self-managed SIPOs. Indeed, if
too many unsophisticated investors lose their shirts in Internet offerings
that are entirely unsuited for them, then the medium itself could lose its ef-
fectiveness as a means of capital formation. The proposed federal suit-
ability standard discussed below will require unseasoned issuers engaged
in self-managed SIPOs to make suitability determinations with respect to
unsophisticated retail investors prior to selling securities to them. Such a
suitability standard protects these issuers' ability to solicit the general
public at large over the Internet, through e-mail, and by other means. Only
after a particular investor has expressed a desire to purchase securities will
an issuer be required to make a suitability determination.
C. FEDERAL AND STATE INITIATIVES IN THE ON-LINE
OFFERING CONTEXT
As discussed below, the SEC has taken significant steps to help pro-
tect investors against on-line fraud. Individual states have also adopted
certain measures in this area, but have generally been less proactive than
the SEC. Unfortunately, neither the SEC nor any individual state has
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adopted any specific measure to ensure that particular securities offered by
unseasoned SIPO issuers over the Internet are suitable for a given investor.
1. Efforts of the SEC
The SEC is well aware of the potential for fraudulent investment ac-
tivity occurring on the Internet. According to two prominent Staff mem-
bers:
[A]s investors turn to the Internet as a source of [investment] informa-
tion and guidance, they will undoubtedly also encounter the dark side of
the Internet. Inhabitants of the dark side, the crooks and thieves who are
always on the lookout for a fresh scheme or a neoteric hook, will take
advantage of the Internet to lie, cheat, steal, and spoil the boom for the
rest of us.
217
In this regard, the SEC's Division of Enforcement (the "Division")
has broken down its Internet-related concerns into the following six cate-
gories: (1) the illegal offer and sale of securities, (2) improper market ma-
nipulation, (3) faulty on-line trading facilities, (4) spamming activities re-
lating to bogus securities and investment opportunities, (5) unregistered
investment advisers and investment newsletters, and (6) unregistered off-
shore broker-dealers and other financial service entities.218  Of these six
categories, only the first relates to the topic of this Article and is discussed
below.
219
217. Celia & Stark, supra note 2, at 816-17. See also Michael Schroeder & Rebecca Buckman,
U.S. Attacks Stock Fraud on Internet, WALL ST. J., Oct. 29, 1998, at Cl; Rebecca Buckman, Cyber-
Sleuths: Dogged On-Line Investors Are SEC's Top Source in Internet Probes, WALL ST. J., Aug. 4,
1998, at Cl; Dean Starkman & John R. Emshwiller, Authorities Probe Growing Wave of Stock-Market
Touts, WALL ST. J., Apr. 23, 1998, at Cl.
218. See Celia & Stark, supra note 2, at 820-35. See also Schroeder & Buckman, supra note
217, at Cl (discussing the SEC's biggest crackdown to date on stock market fraud committed on-line);
Starkman & Emshwiller, supra note 217, at C1 (discussing SEC enforcement actions with respect to
improper market manipulations).
219. The other five concerns are briefly described as follows:
Improper market manipulation involves the posting of false information concerning securities
on message boards and Usenet (Users Network) in an attempt to manipulate the price of a particular
stock. The false information often appears believable because the sender either disguises himself as
someone "in-the-know," such as a corporate insider of a publicly traded company, or assumes or
"spoofs" the identity of a real person for the purpose of impersonation.
Faulty on-line trading facilities involves BBTSs or other on-line trading facilities that operate
without fundamental investor protections. These protections include, among others, the safeguarding
of investors' funds and securities during the transfer process, ensuring that purchasers understand the
risks associated with buying illiquid and speculative securities over the Internet, the provision of last
sale prices, and ensuring ongoing and adequate company disclosure.
Spamming addresses the practice of certain individuals ("spammers") who peddle bogus get-
rich-quick schemes by transmitting their message to an e-mail distribution list. These individuals
combine the skills of mass marketers with the sales tactics of cold-callers. According to the Division,
19981
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The first category covers the offer and sale of securities over the In-
ternet in connection with an offering that is neither registered nor exempt.
Given the "maverick" mentality of many of those involved with the Inter-
net, perhaps it is not surprising that the Division has encountered a class of
securities promoters that "show[s] little concern for the mandates of fed-
eral securities laws." 220 In this regard, the Division seeks to ensure that
investors are making investment decisions with the benefit of legally-
mandated disclosure. Without full disclosure, investors cannot "evaluate
the merits of an investment and fend for themselves."
221
The first category also covers the offer and sale of fraudulent securi-
ties. Not surprisingly, the Division has already bumped into Internet ver-
sions of old-time classics. These include offerings involving pyramid
schemes, eel farms, ostrich farms, cattle breeding, oil and gas drilling, and
portable nuclear reactors. 222  Scam artists selling these "securities" seek
out "credulous investor[s] and divorce them from their savings." 223  Inter-
net newsgroups and message boards224 have proved to be potent tools in
defrauding investors through the sale of bogus securities.225
of all the complaints received by it relating to the Internet, complaints about spamming in connection
with investments rank first.
Unregistered investment advisers and investment newsletters relate primarily to the tremendous
proliferation of individuals on the Internet claiming to be investment advisers without having regis-
tered with the SEC under the Investment Advisers Act of 1940. In addition, this concern also ad-
dresses the numerous investment newsletters posted on the Internet. Publishers of a given newsletter
that hypes a particular stock must disclose the nature and substance of any consideration received
from the issuer, underwriter, or dealer of that security under section 17(b) of the Securities Act.
Unregistered offshore broker-dealers and other financial service entities concern the increasing
number of foreign financial service entities that have been operating in the United States through the
Internet without registering under the Exchange Act as a broker-dealer.
For a more detailed description of these five concerns of the Division, see Celia & Stark, supra
note 2, at 825-35.
220. Id. at 824.
221. HAZEN, supra note 33, § 1.2, at 7.
222. See Celia & Stark, supra note 2, at 821; Alexander C. Gavis, The Offering and Distribution
of Securities in Cyberspace: A Review of Regulatory and Industry Initiatives, 52 BUs. LAW. 317, 361-
62(1996).
223. Cella & Stark, supra note 2, at 822.
224. Newsgroups are usually topic-specific message areas within Usenet (Users Network), a
collection of discussion groups that allow for debate, chat, and discussion across the Internet. Bulle-
tin-board systems, or message boards, allow for the posting of messages, typically to solicit a reply or
to comment on a prior message. See id.
225. See id.
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The Division's initiatives with respect to the Internet do not yet ad-
dress suitability concerns. Except in limited circumstances, 226 the Divi-
sion is simply not charged with the responsibility of ensuring that a par-
ticular security sold in a legally permissible offering is suitable for a
particular investor. This reflects the fundamental premise of the Securities
Act that investors make up their own minds with respect to a particular in-
vestment once they have received full and fair disclosure. As discussed
earlier, however, significant technological developments that aid small
businesses in raising capital give rise to suitability concerns that warrant
the SEC's attention.
2. State Initiatives
Because the Internet "operates as an interstate and international net-
work of computers," and thus "can be accessed by investors from... every
state in the United States," 227 state securities regulators understandably
have expressed concern about Internet offerings. State initiatives in three
areas have a direct impact on issuers engaging in self-managed SIPOs over
the Internet. The first area concerns the jurisdiction of states over Internet
offerings. The second relates to the degree to which administrators in
those states that require registration actually review the merits of SIPOs.
The final area concerns the efforts of states to embrace the test the waters
provision of Regulation A.
a. State Jurisdiction Over Internet Offerings: Many state securities
regulators, together with the NASAA, have examined and taken action
with respect to "the issue of when an offer of securities made over the
Internet or other electronic media would fall under the purview of [a
particular] state's securities laws. 228 This jurisdictional issue is crucial to
SIPO issuers, because the securities they issue are not "covered" securities
exempt from the registration requirements of the various states.229 If a
SIPO conducted over the Internet falls within the jurisdiction of a given
state because it constitutes an offer to sell securities in that state, the issuer
will have to comply with that state's registration requirements.
226. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.15g-9 (1998) (requiring brokers or dealers to make suitability determi-
nations when recommending a penny stock to any client except institutional accredited investors and
officers, directors, and other affiliates of the issuer of that stock).
227. Gavis, supra note 222, at 352.
228. Id. at 323-24.
229. See 15 U.S.C. § 77r (Supp. III 1997).
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In resolving this jurisdictional issue, the Commonwealth of Pennsyl-
vania has taken the lead.23° Pennsylvania believed that an Internet offering
constituted an offer for the purchase or sale of a security and a general so-
licitation under its blue sky laws.231  In August 1995, however, Pennsyl-
vania issued a discretionary order that provided issuers with a self-
executing exemption from state law registration with respect to the offer,
but not the sale, of securities over the Internet if three conditions were
met. 32 First, an issuer must indicate, through either direct or indirect lan-
guage, that no offer or sale of the securities is intended to take place in
Pennsylvania. Second, the issuer or anyone acting on its behalf must re-
frain from directing an offering of securities to any person in Pennsylva-
nia. Finally, the issuer must not sell any of its securities in Pennsylvania
as a result of the Internet offering. With respect to this final condition, the
Pennsylvania order prohibited an issuer that relied on the Internet exemp-
tion to register and sell the securities that were offered over the Internet
within the state at a later date.
233
Concerned about uniformity with respect to a state law Internet ex-
emption, the NASAA in January 1996 adopted a resolution that encour-
aged all "state security regulators to develop a uniform policy concerning
offers of securities on the Internet that is consistent with the goals of inves-
tor protection and access to capital markets."2 34 The resolution contained
a model exemption that could be adopted by the states. This exemption
was substantially similar to the Pennsylvania exemption, except that if
certain conditions were met, issuers that took advantage of the exemption
could later register and sell the securities subject to the exemption in that
230. See Gavis, supra note 222, at 354.
231. According to the Deputy Chief Counsel of the Pennsylvania Securities Commission:
Based on the fact that materials appearing on the Internet are available to anyone in Penn-
sylvania who has access to a computer, a modem and a phone line .... a communication on
the Internet designed to raise capital for an issuer would constitute an offer for the purchase
or sale of a security... under [the 1972 Pennsylvania Securities Act] ... and, for purposes
of [that Act], constitute a mass mailing, public media advertisement and general solicitation.
G. Philip Rutledge, Securities Commission Addresses Internet Offerings (visited Apr. 1, 1997)
<http://www.state.pa.us/PA_ Exec/Securities/corpfin/intemetl.html>. See also The Pennsylvania Se-
curities Act of 1972, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 70, § 1-101 (West 1994).
232. See In re Offers Effected Through Internet That Do Not Result in Sales in Pennsylvania,
1995 WL 5746478 (Pa. Sec. Comm'n 1995) (admin. order).
233. Apparently the objective of this prohibition is to ensure that issuers that receive a tremen-
dous response through e-mail or other means from Pennsylvania residents to an exempt offering do
not later register that offering in an effort to take advantage of the interest shown. Such after-the-fact
registrations would allow exempted offerings to be "utilized by an issuer as a universal 'Test the Wa-
ters' procedure." K. Robert Bertram, Advanced Technology Issues-the Internet, and State Securities
Rigistration-a Primer, PA. B. ASS'N Q., July 1996, at 137 n.34.




state.235 Today, thirty-eight states have adopted Internet offering exemp-
tions.236  Predictably, the exemptions are neither consistent as among
themselves nor with the NASAA model.237
b. State Registration Requirements and Merit Review: If a SIPO
issuer conducting an Internet offering intends to target offerees in a
particular state, it must comply with the registration requirements of that
state.238 Although significant differences exist among state securities
laws, most states have adopted variants of either the Uniform Securities
Act or the Revised Uniform Securities Act.239 Both acts require an issuer
to register an offering at the state level generally in one of three ways,
depending on how long an issuer has been established and whether the
issuer is registering the offering on the federal level or relying on a federal
registration exemption. These three ways are "registration by
notification," 240 "registration by coordination," 241 and "registration by
qualification."
242
For purposes of this Article, only the first and third methods of state
registration are important. The second method-registration by coordina-
tion-is the easiest, as it simply requires an issuer to file copies of its cur-
rent federal prospectus and any other information requested by a state
securities administrator at the state level.243  State registration then be-
235. One of the following two conditions must be met in order to sell the securities in state at a
later date: "(A) No sales of the securities [are] made in any state until the offering has been registered
and declared effective and the final prospectus ... has been delivered to the investor prior to such
sale; or (B) The sales are exempt from registration." Id.
236. The following states have adopted Internet offering exemptions either through legislation or
agency actions: Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware,
Florida, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Mis-
sissippi, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Jersey, New York, North Dakota, Ohio, Pennsylvania,
Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, Washington, West
Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. For a listing of those states that have adopted a version of the
NASAA Resolution, see Internet: Exemption (For Offers) and BD/IA Advertising, 1 Blue Sky L. Rep.
(CCH) 6481, at 2581 (1999).
237. See Gavis, supra note 222, at 358.
238. As discussed previously, Regulation A securities are required to be registered under state
law because they do not constitute "covered" securities for purposes of section 18 of the Securities
Act. See supra text accompanying notes 65-69. In addition, it should be noted that Regulation A is-
suers cannot take advantage of the most widely available state law exemptions to registration. See
Rutherford B. Campbell, Jr., Blue Sky Laws and the Recent Congressional Preemption Failure, 22 J.
CORP. L. 175, 193 (1997).
239. UNIF. SEC. ACT (amended 1997); REViSED UNIF. SEC. ACT (1985).
240. UNIF. SEC. ACT § 302; REVISED UNIF. SEC. ACT § 302. The Revised Uniform Securities
Act refers to the concept of "registration by notification" as "registration by filing."
241. UNIF. SEC. ACT § 303; REVISED UNiF. SEC. ACT § 303.
242. UNIF. SEC. ACT § 304; REviSED UNIF. SEC. ACT § 304.
243. See sources cited in supra note 241.
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comes effective concurrently upon the effectiveness of the issuer's federal
registration statement.244 Registration by coordination, however, is only
available for offerings officially registered under the Securities Act. SIPO
issuers, therefore, cannot avail themselves of this method of state registra-
tion.245
Whether or not a SIPO issuer can register by qualification or notifica-
tion at the state level generally depends on how long the issuer has been in
business. Registration by notification entails the filing of a short-form
registration statement containing factual information about the issuer and
the offering, and the payment of a registration fee. 24 6 To take advantage of
registration by notification, however, an issuer generally must have had an
established business for at least five years.247 Otherwise, the issuer must
file the dreary, long-form registration statement used in connection with
registration by qualification.
Registration of securities by qualification is required when neither a
registration exemption nor another registration procedure is available.
Once an issuer has filed on the prescribed form, the securities administra-
tor of a given state may analyze the merits of the offering before allowing
securities to be sold within that state's borders. While the severity of the
merit review applied by securities administrators varies between states,
such review generally goes beyond the full disclosure approach of the Se-
curities Act.248 In this regard, state securities administrators generally are
given broader authority than the SEC to deny the effectiveness of a regis-
tration statement.249 Once they are satisfied with a particular offering,
however, these administrators may declare it effective by either an entry in
a given state's registry of securities or by the issuance of a permit.
250
As this discussion suggests, the states theoretically can partially fill in
the "merit review" gap that exists when SIPO issuers self-manage their of-
ferings. The author uses the term "theoretically" because of the uncer-
tainty surrounding the ability of state security administrators to provide the
same thorough, consistent, and cold-hearted review as that provided by a
profit-motivated investment bank in the registered offering context. Nev-
244. See I Blue Sky L. Rep. (CCH) 511, at 385 (1997); HAzEN, supra note 33, § 8.2, at 397.
245. See HAZEN, supra note 33, § 8.2, at 397-98.
246. See I Blue Sky L. Rep. (CCH) 1 510, at 385 (1997).
247. See sources cited supra note 240.
248. See generally HAZEN, supra note 33, § 8.1, at 389.
249. See generally id. § 8.2, at 394.
250. See 1 Blue Sky L. Rep. (CCH) 513, at 386 (1997).
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ertheless, one can argue that the states could at least partially plug this
hole.
c. Testing the Waters Under State Securities Laws: States also have
dampened the enthusiasm surrounding Regulation A's test the waters
provision. That provision, along with the rest of the Small Business
Initiatives, was proposed unilaterally by the SEC without first coordinating
with state securities administrators.2 5' To put it mildly, the states were not
amused. "State regulators have argued that the 'test the waters' provision
deregulates the riskiest securities, small tentative offerings, leaving
investors unprotected and vulnerable to sales techniques employed by
these businesses." 252 The NASAA joined by arguing that encouraging
uninformed decisions by investors was anathema to the purposes behind
securities regulation. 253 The end result was that state securities laws were
not changed when the Small Business Initiatives were enacted in 1992.
The NASAA eventually attempted to coordinate state law with the
Small Business Initiatives by developing its own proposal for testing the
waters. The NASAA's proposal, however, requires issuers to supply more
information in their solicitation materials directed to investors than does
Regulation A's Rule 254. It also requires a longer period of time to pass
between submission of those materials to regulators and their communica-
tion to the public.
254
State adoption of the NASAA proposal has occurred slowly, and
some states have fashioned their own versions or have failed to adopt one
at all.255 Because the states' ability to regulate SIPOs remained intact fol-
lowing the passage of NSMIA, testing the waters cannot occur in states
that have not embraced it.256 Even with regard to those states that have
251. See Impact of Small Business Initiatives, supra note 33, at 522-23.
252. Id. at 520-21.
253. See Stanley Keller, SEC Small Business Initiatives: New Opportunities Created, PRENTICE
HALL L. & Bus. INSIGHTS, June 1993, at 15.
254. See id. For a more thorough discussion of the differences between Regulation A's Rule 254
and the NASAA's proposal, see Note, supra note 85, at 507-11.
255. For example, Oklahoma does not have any statute or rule specifically concerning test the
waters solicitations. Issuers are required to submit solicitation materials in advance of their use along
with a $250 fee as part of a request for a discretionary exemption under section 401(b)(22) of the
Oklahoma Securities Act. See OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, §§ 401(b)(22), 412 (West Supp. 1997). If
granted, that discretionary exemption will cover offers made in connection with those materials but
not sales. See Statement from the Oklahoma Securities Department on Testing The Waters issued by
the Oklahoma Securities Department (facsimile received by the author on Nov. 12, 1998) (on file with
author).
256. See Impact of Small Business Initiatives, supra note 33, at 521-22; Keith J. Mendelson &
Cindy R. Shepard, The SEC's Proposed Small Business Initiative: Bold Reform or Opportunity For-
gone?, PRENTICE HALL L. & Bus. INSIGHTS, July 1992, at 12, 18.
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adopted the NASAA's proposal, issuers must navigate carefully within the
borders of both the federal and state provisions when testing the waters.
In summary, the states can help reduce the exposure of unpreferred
retail investors to self-managed SIPOs conducted over the Internet in two
ways. The first is through their ability to review the merits of those offer-
ings and, if necessary, to pull the plug on the least meritorious. The sec-
ond is by frustrating the effectiveness of Regulation A's test the waters
provision by either prohibiting those solicitations outright or by modifying
the requirements associated with those solicitations in a way that better
protects investors. Nevertheless, once the states have declared a particular
self-managed SIPO effective, they do not involve themselves with ensur-
ing that particular securities are suitable for a given investor. Similar to
the position taken under federal law, once investors are provided with ade-
quate disclosure, the states leave them to fend for themselves.
IV. TOWARDS A NEW "SUITABILITY" STANDARD FOR
SELF-MANAGED SIPOS CONDUCTED BY
UNSEASONED ISSUERS
As seen earlier, new technologies have materially altered the tradi-
tional financing roadmap followed by young, growing companies. These
technologies allow unseasoned issuers to conduct public offerings earlier
in their business development cycles than ever before. By combining
these technologies with the ability to solicit the general public under Rule
504 and Regulation A, issuers are able to pitch their securities directly to
the masses at very little cost and without the aid of underwriters. This
ability raises substantial concerns over how suitable many of these offer-
ings are for unsophisticated retail investors. New federal and state initia-
tives in the on-line area unfortunately do not address these concerns. In
addition, while certain states review the merits of these offerings, their re-
views are inherently unpredictable and subjective in nature, and fail to fo-
cus on each investor's particular characteristics.
A. EXISTING SUITABILITY STANDARDS
This author argues that a new federal suitability standard applicable to
self-managed SIPOs directed at unsophisticated retail investors by unsea-
soned companies is warranted. In developing this standard, it is helpful to
analyze the two main suitability standards currently employed in the se-
curities field. One of these standards is used by the NASD, while the other
is employed by the SEC in connection with "penny stocks."
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1. NASD Suitability Standard
As a self-regulatory organization, the NASD is responsible for polic-
ing the sales practices of its broker-dealer members and registered broker
representatives. These practices historically have been plagued by in-
stances of heavy-handedness, overreaching, and outright greed on the part
of brokers.2 57 In an attempt to prevent brokers from taking advantage of
their brokerage customers, the NASD has implemented a number of rules
governing transactions between brokers and their customers.
258
The most important NASD rule for purposes of this Article is entitled
"Recommendations to Customers (Suitability)," which this author will re-
fer to as the NASD Suitability Rule.259 The NASD Suitability Rule only
applies to broker recommendations to clients to purchase, sell, or exchange
any security.260 In making these recommendations, a broker must have
"reasonable grounds for believing" that her recommendation is suitable for
her customer based on the facts, if any, disclosed by that customer as to
"his other security holdings and as to his financial situation and needs."
261
The NASD Suitability Rule is one of wide application, as it applies to bro-
ker recommendations to both retail and institutional customers alike.2 62 It
also applies with respect to a recommendation of virtually any security,
whether equity, debt, or derivative, of any issuer, whether seasoned or un-
seasoned.
257. See generally Stuart D. Root, Suitability-the Sophisticated Investor-and Modem Portfo-
lio Management, 1991 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 287.
258. See NASD MANUAL CONDUCr RULE 2300 (National Ass'n of Sec. Dealers, Inc. 1996)
(Transactions with Customers).
259. See id. CoNDUCr RULE 2310 (Recommendations to Customers (Suitability)). This rule
provides:
(a) In recommending to a customer the purchase, sale or exchange of any security, a mem-
ber shall have reasonable grounds for believing that the recommendation is suitable for such
customer upon the basis of the facts, if any, disclosed by such customer as to his other se-
curity holdings and as to his financial situation and needs.
(b) Prior to the execution of a transaction recommended to a noninstitutional customer,
other than transactions with customers where investments are limited to money market mu-
tual funds, a member shall make reasonable efforts to obtain information concerning:
(1) the customer's financial status;
(2) the customer's tax status;
(3) the customer's investment objectives; and
(4) such other information used or considered to be reasonable by such member or
registered representative in making recommendations to the customer.
260. Importantly, the NASD Suitability Rule does not apply to issuer solicitations made directly
to prospective investors.
261. NASD MANUAL CONDUCrRULE 2310(a).
262. See id.; Root, supra note 257, at 291.
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With respect to a given retail customer, the NASD Suitability Rule
requires a broker to be proactive in developing "reasonable grounds for
believing" that a particular security, other than a money market mutual
fund, is suitable for that customer.263 Thus, a broker must make reason-
able efforts to obtain information about that customer. This information
includes the customer's financial status, tax status, and investment objec-
tives. In addition, the broker must consider any other information that she
considers reasonable in making recommendations to that customer.
264
Clearly, reasonable efforts require a broker to directly ask the cus-
tomer for this information, either orally or in writing. In this regard, most
brokerage houses ask for suitability-related information in the investor
questionnaire completed by new brokerage customers. The NASD Suit-
ability Rule, however, makes an exception for recalcitrant customers who
are not willing to proffer the facts necessary to make a suitability determi-
nation. Indeed, the rule requires suitability determinations to be made
based on facts, "if any," disclosed by the customer.
265
Further fleshing out the NASD Suitability Rule are two NASD inter-
pretive memos ("IMs"). 2 6 6 The first IM alerts NASD members to the pos-
sible application of Exchange Act Rule 15c2-6 (recently renumbered to
15g-6) to recommendations made by those members and registered brokers
to customers relating to certain low-priced stocks.2 67 Exchange Act Rule
15g-6 and other related rules are discussed below in greater detail.
The second IM discusses in depth the topic of fair dealing with bro-
kerage customers. The IM first asserts that "[i]mplicit in all member and
registered representative relationships with customers and others is the
fundamental responsibility for fair dealing."2 68 In this regard, sales efforts
must conform to the ethical standards of the NASD. Importantly, the IM
adds:
This does not mean that legitimate sales efforts in the securities business
are to be discouraged .... It does mean, however, that sales efforts must
263. The NASD Suitability Rule is silent with respect to institutional customers in this regard.
264. See NASD MANUAL CONDUCT RULE 2310(b).
265. See id. CONDUCT RULE 2310(a).
266. See id. IM-2310-1 (Possible Application of SEC Rule 15c2-6); id. IM-2310-2 (Fair Dealing
with Customers).
267. This IM states in pertinent part:
Members should be aware that, effective January 1, 1990, any transaction which involves a
non-Nasdaq, non-exchange equity security trading for less than five dollars per share may be
subject to the provisions of SEC Rule 15c2-6 [now 15g-6], and this Rule should be reviewed





be judged on the basis of whether they can be reasonably said to repre-
sent fair treatment for the persons to whom the sales efforts are directed,
rather than on the argument that they result in profits to customers.
2 6 9
In other words, recommending a security solely because a customer could
potentially profit by owning it does not constitute fair treatment of that
customer. Indeed, the profitability potential of a security alone is not an
adequate basis for determining the suitability of that security for a
particular customer.
The second IM also provides five examples of conduct that "clearly
violate[]" the responsibility of fair dealing to customers.270 Important for
purposes of this Article are the first and fifth examples.271 These examples
cover the following types of conduct:
(1) Recommending Speculative Low-Priced Securities-Recommending
speculative low-priced securities to customers without knowledge of or
attempt to obtain information concerning the customers' other securities
holdings, their financial situation and other necessary data [violates the
responsibility of fair dealing]. The principle here is that this practice, by
its very nature, involves a high probability that the recommendation will
not be suitable for at least some of the persons solicited. This has par-
ticular application to high pressure telephone sales campaigns.
(5) Recommending Purchases Beyond Customer Capability-
Recommending the purchase of securities or the continuing purchase of
securities in amounts which are inconsistent with the reasonable expec-
tation that the customer has the financial ability to meet such a commit-
ment [violates the responsibility of fair dealing].272
Needless to say, these same concerns arise when unseasoned issuers
conduct self-managed SIPOs over the Internet directed at unsophisticated
retail investors.
269. Id. IM-2310-2(a)(2) (emphasis added).
270. See id. IM-2310-2(b)(1)-(5).
271. Examples two through four deal with the following types of conduct:
(2) Excessive trading activity, often referred to as "churning" or "overtrading";
(3) Trading in mutualfund shares, particularly on a short-term basis;
(4) Fraudulent activity, including, without limitation, establishing fictitious accounts, en-
gaging in unauthorized transactions, misusing customers' funds or securities, forgery and
nondisclosure of material facts.
Id. IM-2310-2(b)(2)-(4).
272. Id. IM-2310-2(b)(1), (5).
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2. SEC Suitability Standard for "Penny Stocks"
The SEC's suitability standard relates solely to so-called "penny
stocks" and reflects the congressional concern over those stocks as embod-
ied in section 15(g) of the Exchange Act.273 Other than providing that a
"penny stock" is an "equity security," however, Congress has left it up to
the SEC for the most part to define that term.274 In this regard, the SEC
has defined "penny stock" in Exchange Act Rule 3a5 1-1275 as every equity
security other than those that meet, as a general matter, the criteria of at
least one of seven exemptive categories.276 These categories effectively
exclude from the penny stock classification the vast majority of equity se-
curities.2 77 Those that fall within the definition primarily do so because
they constitute low-priced securities and/or are securities of an unseasoned
issuer.2
78
With respect to low-priced securities, Exchange Act Rule 3a51-1
provides that any equity security that is purchased or sold in a transaction
for less than five dollars-excluding any broker or dealer commission,
commission equivalent, mark-up, or mark-down 279-is considered a penny
stock unless the security is otherwise exempt.280  While the Five Dollar
Rule captures within the definition of "penny stock" an equity security is-
273. 15 U.S.C. § 78o(g) (1994 & Supp. III 1997).
274. See id. § 78c(a)(51) (defining "penny stock"). The Exchange Act defines "equity security"
as follows:
The term "equity security" means any stock or similar security; or any security convertible,
with or without consideration, into such a security, or carrying any warrant or right to sub-
scribe to or purchase such a security; or any such warrant or right; or any other security
which the [SEC] shall deem to be of similar nature and consider necessary or appropriate, by
such rules and regulations as it may prescribe in the public interest or for the protection of
investors, to treat as an equity security.
Id. § 78c(a)(1 1).
275. 17 C.F.R. § 240.3a51-1 (1998).
276. In certain instances, an equity security may have to meet the criteria of more than one cate-
gory to avoid classification as a penny stock. See id. § 240.3a51-1(a), (e)(2), (0. For example, an
equity security that is authorized for quotation on Nasdaq must also meet the criteria of one of four
other specified categories or it will be deemed a penny stock. See id. § 240.3a51-1(f).
277. Subject to certain exceptions, the following equity securities fall outside the definition of
"penny stock": (i) those for which transaction reports containing price and volume data relating to
round lot purchases and sales are collected, processed, and made available pursuant to an effective
transaction reporting plan; (ii) those issued by an investment company registered under the Investment
Company Act of 1940; (iii) those that constitute put or call options issued by the Options Clearing
Corporation; (iv) those that are registered, or approved for registration, on a national securities ex-
change; or (v) those that are authorized, or approved for authorization upon official notice of issuance,
for quotation on Nasdaq. See id. § 240.3a51-1(a), (b), (c), (e), (f).
278. See id. § 240.3a51-1(d), (g).
279. See id. § 240.3a51-1(d)(1)(i).
280. The author refers to this rule as the "Five Dollar Rule."
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sued in an IPO for less than five dollars per share,28' wily IPO issuers can
take simple steps to ensure that their securities are sold for at least five
dollars per share or more.282 This stems from the fact that the per share
offering price of IPO shares is simply a function of the aggregate amount
of proceeds to be raised and the number of shares to be offered. Once
those securities start trading in the secondary market, however, the Five
Dollar Rule applies if the trading value falls below five dollars per share
unless the security is otherwise exempt. Issuers once again could remedy
this situation by simply effecting reverse stock splits to raise per share
trading prices.
Exchange Act Rule 3a51-1 also provides that the equity securities of
an issuer will be deemed penny stocks if the issuer is not financially sea-
soned unless those securities are otherwise exempt.283 The "seasoning" of
an issuer is measured against two specific financial milestones. If the is-
suer has not achieved at least one of these financial milestones, then its se-
curities will be considered penny stocks unless they are otherwise exempt.
Unlike the Five Dollar Rule, which can be avoided by savvy issuers, the
Financial Seasoning Rule is not so easily circumvented.
The first milestone of the Financial Seasoning Rule relates to the is-
suer's net tangible assets. "Net tangible assets" is defined as the issuer's
total assets less intangible assets and liabilities.284  Assuming the equity
securities of an issuer are not otherwise exempt, those securities will be
deemed penny stocks unless the issuer has been in continuous operation (a)
for three years or more and has net tangible assets in excess of $2 million
or (b) for less than three years and has net tangible assets in excess of $5
million.2 85 Thus, the Financial Seasoning Rule rightfully reserves the
highest net tangible assets requirement for the youngest, most unseasoned
companies.
The second milestone relates to the issuer's revenues. Unless an is-
suer's equity securities are otherwise exempt, those securities will be
281. For example, the common stock issued as part of Spring Street's two Regulation A offerings
would be considered "penny stock" for purposes of Exchange Act Rule 3a51-1(d)(1), because the of-
fering prices for the stock were both below five dollars per share and the stock was not otherwise ex-
empt. See SPRING STREEr OFFERING CIRCULAR I, supra note 44, at Cover Page ($1.85 per share offer-
ing price); SPRING STREEr OFFERING CIRCULAR II, supra note 44, at Cover Page ($2.75 per share
offering price).
282. Of course, an issuer must be mindful that enough shares are outstanding-the concept of
"float"--to facilitate trading of its common stock in the secondary market.
283. The author refers to this rule as the "Financial Seasoning Rule."
284. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.3a51-1(g)(1).
285. See id.
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deemed penny stocks if the issuer's average revenues are less than $6 mil-
lion for the last three years.286 Thus, any issuer that has not been in exis-
tence for at least three years must satisfy the higher net tangible assets
milestone applicable to the youngest of companies if it is relying on the
Financial Seasoning Rule to exclude its equity securities from the penny
stock classification.
287
Once it is determined that a particular equity security of an issuer is a
penny stock, then any broker selling that security to, or effecting the pur-
chase of it by, a customer must comply with a set of seven rules designed
to protect the customer.288 Of particular importance to this Article is Ex-
change Act Rule 15g-9, the "SEC Suitability Rule."289 This rule sets forth
broker-dealer sales practice requirements for penny stocks in an effort to
"prevent fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative acts or practices" by those
brokers or dealers in connection with penny stock transactions.
290
Subject to certain exceptions discussed below, Rule 15g-9 generally
makes it unlawful for a broker or dealer to sell a penny stock to, or to ef-
fect the purchase by, any person unless two requirements have been met
prior to the time the transaction is effected.291 First, the broker or dealer
must have approved the person's account for transactions in penny
stocks.292 Second, the broker or dealer must have received from the person
a written agreement to the "transaction setting forth the identity and
quantity of the penny stock to be purchased. 293
The heart of the SEC Suitability Rule is the procedure by which a
broker or dealer approves a customer's account for transactions in penny
stocks. This rather involved procedure requires brokers and dealers to take
four steps. The first step is to obtain from the customer "information con-
cerning the person's financial situation, investment experience, and in-
vestment objectives." 294 The second step is to "[r]easonably determine,"
286. See id. § 240.3a51-1(g)(2).
287. Net tangible assets (in the case of the first milestone) and average revenues (in the ease of
the second) must be demonstrated by the most recent audited financial statements dated less than 15
months prior to the date of the transaction in question. See id. § 240.3a51-1(g)(3).
288. See id. §§ 240.15g-2 to .15g-9 (currently no Exchange Act Rule 15g-7 exists).
289. Id. § 240.15g-9.
290. Id. § 240.15g-9(a).
291. Importantly, the SEC Suitability Rule does not apply to issuer solicitations made directly to
prospective investors.
292. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.15g-9(a)(2)(i).
293. Id. § 240.15g-9(a)(2)(ii).
294. Id. § 240.15g-9(b)(1). Cf. NASD MANUAL Conduct Rule 2310(b) (National Ass'n of Sec.
Dealers, Inc. 1996) (setting forth the customer-specific information that a NASD member must make
reasonable efforts to obtain in order to satisfy the NASD Suitability Rule).
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based on the customer-specific information obtained and any other infor-
mation known by the broker-dealer about the customer, that (i) transac-
tions in penny stocks are suitable for the customer and (ii) the customer (or
the customer's independent adviser in penny stock transactions) "has suf-
ficient knowledge and experience in financial matters that the [customer]
(or the [customer's] independent adviser... ) reasonably may be expected
to be capable of evaluating the risks of transactions in penny stocks. '295
The "knowledge and experience" requirement, of course, is substantially
similar to, but not exactly the same as, the "sophisticated purchaser" stan-
dard applied in the context of Rule 506 offerings under Regulation D.2 9
6
The third step that a broker or dealer must take in order to approve a
customer's account for penny stock transactions is to deliver to the cus-
tomer a written statement detailing, among other things, the basis upon
which the broker or dealer made her suitability determination. The state-
ment also must notify the customer that it is unlawful for the broker or
dealer to effect a penny stock trade unless he has received a written agree-
ment to the transaction from the customer prior to the trade.297 Finally, the
broker or dealer must obtain from the customer "a manually signed and
dated copy of the written statement.
298
Not all penny stock transactions require brokers and dealers to jump
through these hoops. Indeed, many transactions are specifically exempt
from the application of Exchange Act Rule 15g-9.299 For example, trans-
actions not recommended by the broker or dealer are exempt,3 0 as are
transactions with "institutional accredited investors" as defined in Regula-
tion D of the Securities Act.3 ' In addition, transactions in which the pur-
chaser is an "established customer" of the broker or dealer are exempt.30 2
295. 17 C.F.R. § 240.15g-9(b)(2).
296. See id. § 230.506(b)(2)(ii). This rule requires an issuer to have a "reasonable belief' that
each unaccredited investor in a Rule 506 offering, "either alone or with his purchaser representa-
tive(s), has such knowledge and experience in financial and business matters that he is capable of
evaluating the merits and risks of the prospective investment." Id.
297. See id. § 240.15g-9(b)(3). The written statement must also state, in highlighted format im-
mediately preceding the customer signature line, that the broker or dealer is required to provide the
customer with the written statement and that the customer should not sign and return it if it does not
accurately reflect the person's financial situation, investment experience, and investment objectives.
298. Id. § 240.15g-9(b)(4).
299. See id. § 240.15g-9(c).
300. See id. §§ 240.15g-9(c)(1), .15g-l(e).
301. Id. §§ 240.15g-9(c)(1), .15g-l(b). An "institutional accredited investor" means an investor
that meets the criteria of Securities Act Rule 501(a)(1)-(3), (7), (8). See id. § 240.15g-l(b).
302. See id. § 240.15g-9(c)(3). An "established customer" of a broker or dealer means:
any person for whom the broker or dealer, or a clearing broker on behalf of such broker or
dealer, carries an account, and who in such account:
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Finally, transactions that either meet the requirements of Securities Act
Rule 505 or 506, but not 504,303 or qualify for the section 4(2) private
placement exemption under the Securities Act are also exempt.
3 °4
B. PROPOSED FEDERAL SUITABILITY STANDARD FOR SELF-MANAGED
SIPOS CONDUCTED BY UNSEASONED ISSUERS
The NASD Suitability Rule and the SEC Suitability Rule can form the
foundation of a new federal suitability standard for self-managed SIPOs
conducted by unseasoned issuers directed at unsophisticated retail inves-
tors. Although neither rule applies to issuers per se, both contain desirable
provisions that, once refined, can provide the basis for a new standard.
The SEC should implement the following new standard by adding it as a
new rule to Regulation A and as a new subparagraph to Rule 504 of
Regulation D.
1. Proposed Federal Suitability Standard
The proposed federal suitability standard (the "Standard") reads as
follows:
Sales Practice Requirements Applicable to Certain Offerings
(a) As a means reasonably designed to prevent fraudulent, deceptive,
or manipulative acts or practices, it shall be unlawful for any issuer to
sell any security of that issuer to, or to effect the purchase of such secu-
rity by, any person in reliance on [Regulation A] [Rule 504] unless at
least one of the following provisions is met:
(1) Such issuer has:
(A) Net tangible assets (total assets less intangible assets and
liabilities) in excess of (i) $2 million if the issuer has been in
(i) Has effected securities transactions, or made a deposit of funds or securities, more
than one year previously; or
(ii) Has made three purchases of penny stocks that occurred on three separate days and
involved different issuers.
Id. § 240.15g-9(d)(2).
303. It is clear that the SEC has singled out securities issued in a Rule 504 offering for special
treatment. A more inclusive exemption in Exchange Act Rule 15g-l(c), which could have been incor-
porated by reference into the exemption list for the SEC Suitability Rule, was discarded in favor of a
custom-tailored exemption set forth within the SEC Suitability Rule. Compare id. § 240.15g-l(c)
(including Rule 504 securities), with id. § 240.15g-9(c)(2) (excluding Rule 504 securities). By sin-
gling out Rule 504 securities, the SEC has underscored its concern about issuers who issue penny
stocks pursuant to a Rule 504 exemption to the registration requirements of the Securities Act with the
help of brokers or dealers. Interestingly, securities offered pursuant to Regulation A are not specifi-
cally addressed by either exemption, while securities offered pursuant to Rule 504 are addressed.
304. See id. § 240.15g-9(c)(2).
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continuous operation in substantially the same line or lines of
business for at least three years, or (ii) $5 million, if the issuer
has been in continuous operation in substantially the same line
or lines of business for less than three years; or
(B) Total revenue of at least $5 million for each of the last
three fiscal years;
(2) Such security is sold to such person as part of an offering un-
derwritten on a firm commitment basis by one or more underwrit-
ers;
(3) Such person is:
(A) An accredited investor, as defined in Rule 501(a); or
(B) Currently the direct or indirect beneficial owner of more
than five percent of any class of equity security of the issuer;
(4) Such person has beneficially and continuously owned securi-
ties of the issuer for more than one year and, if those securities
were purchased from the issuer after the effective date of this rule
as part of an offering exempt from registration pursuant to section
3(b) of the Securities Act, the issuer complied with the require-
ments of this rule in connection with such previous sale; or
(5) Prior to such sale, such issuer shall have reasonably deter-
mined that the type and amount of securities proposed to be pur-
chased by such person are suitable for such person based on the
information specified in paragraph (b)(3) of this rule and any other
information about such person known by such issuer at or prior to
the time of sale.
(b) (1) For purposes of paragraph (a)(1) of this rule, net tangible as-
sets or total revenues must be demonstrated by financial statements of
the issuer that (A) have been audited and reported on by an independent
public accountant in accordance with the provisions of Rule 2-02 of
Regulation S-X and (B) are dated less than fifteen months prior to the
date of the proposed sale; provided, however, that if the issuer does not
have audited financial statements, then the issuer's most recent unau-
dited financial statements dated less than fifteen months prior to the date
of the proposed sale shall be used.
(2) For purposes of paragraph (a)(2) of this rule:
(A) An "offering underwritten on a firm commitment basis" is
an offering with respect to which an issuer has contractually
agreed in writing, subject to usual and customary conditions,
to sell the entire allotment of securities offered to one or more
securities firms, whether or not represented by one or more
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managers, managing underwriters, or principal underwriters;
and
(B) An "underwriter" is any person (i) qualifying as such un-
der section 2(11) of the Securities Act, (ii) having net tangible
assets of $25 million or more at the time of the offering, and
(iii) having engaged in the underwriting of securities as one of
its primary businesses during the twelve months immediately
preceding the offering.
(3) For purposes of making a suitability determination pursuant to
paragraph (a)(5) of this rule, the issuer shall obtain a written
statement from such person setting forth information concerning:
(A) The financial condition or the combined financial condi-
tion of that person and that person's spouse, if any;
(B) The knowledge and experience in financial and business
matters of that person and/or that of any purchaser representa-
tive of that person who qualifies as such under Rule 501(h);
and
(C) The investment objectives of that person.
The written statement may constitute a stand-alone document, such
as a purchaser's questionnaire, or it may be contained within an-
other document, such as a subscription agreement for the purchase
of securities. The written statement may be transmitted to the is-
suer either in paper or electronic form.
(c) Any specific sale of securities made in contravention of the provi-
sions of this rule shall not be exempt under section 3(b) from the regis-
tration requirements of the Securities Act. In addition, the SEC may at
any time enter an order temporarily or permanently suspending an is-
suer's section 3(b) exemption with respect to an entire offering if the
SEC has reason to believe that such issuer is systematically selling,
whether deliberately or unintentionally, securities in contravention of the
provisions of this rule.
2. An Explanation of the Proposed Standard
The Standard is designed to ensure that the securities of unseasoned
issuers offered in self-managed SIPOs are channeled into the portfolios of
investors, particularly retail investors, for whom the securities are suitable.
Furthermore, application of the Standard is not dependent on the method
by which a SIPO issuer advertises its offering. Thus, offerings conducted
over the Internet, through other electronic media, and through more tradi-
tional methods are covered. Because the use of the Internet and other
electronic media increases the feasibility of SIPOs, however, the Standard
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naturally will have the most impact on SIPOs employing these new tech-
nologies.
The standard itself is made up of three main paragraphs. Paragraph
(a) begins by noting that the Standard's purpose is to prevent "fraudulent,
deceptive, or manipulative acts or practices." This language is also used in
the initial provision of the SEC Suitability Rule.30 5 While its use in that
rule is aimed at brokers and dealers committing malfeasance, its use in the
Standard is aimed at issuers that take unfair advantage of investors by
selling them securities that are not suited to their portfolios.
On its face, paragraph (a) applies to all issuers; however, all
"seasoned" issuers are specifically exempted from its application. Like the
NASD Suitability Rule, paragraph (a) applies to "any security." In this re-
gard, the "equity security" limitation of the SEC Suitability Rule was not
embraced, because debt and other securities of an issuer can be just as un-
suitable for a particular investor as can equity securities. In addition, the
SEC's Five Dollar Rule was also rejected, because security prices can be
manipulated by issuers too easily for a low priced-security concept to have
real teeth.
Paragraph (a) also applies only to "sales" that issuers make in reliance
on a small issue offering exemption, and not to offers. This means that is-
suers can freely solicit prospective investors over the Internet and other
media without first making suitability determinations. Paragraph (a) also
includes the language "to effect the purchase of such security" in addition
to the words "to sell any security of that issuer." This additional language
helps capture situations in which an issuer sells its securities indirectly
through certain agents.
Paragraph (a) continues with a list of five exemptions. Unless the
provisions of at least one of these five exemptions is satisfied, the penalty
provision of paragraph (c) applies. The first exemption relates to the type
of issuer offering the securities. "Seasoned" issuers are specifically ex-
cluded from the application of the Standard. To be considered "seasoned,"
an issuer must meet at least one of the two financial milestones set forth in
the first exemption. These financial milestones are similar to those con-
tained in the definition of "penny stock" used in connection with the
SEC's Suitability Rule.
The first financial milestone is based on the "net tangible assets" of
an issuer. Net tangible assets is defined as an issuer's total assets less its
305. See id. § 240.15g-9(a).
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intangible assets and liabilities. Similar to the Exchange Act's "penny
stock" definition, in order to be deemed "seasoned" based on net tangible
assets an issuer must have net tangible assets in excess of (i) $2 million, if
it has been in continuous operation for three or more years, or (ii) $5 mil-
lion, if it has been in continuous operation less than three years. Unlike
the "penny stock" definition, however, the issuer's continuous operation
has to have been "in substantially the same line or lines of business." This
additional language protects investors from the situation in which an issuer
changes its business focus and thus has no real track record in its current
line of business.
The second financial milestone is based on the issuer's total revenue.
While also based on the "penny stock" definition, the proposed language
has significant changes. The penny stock requirement of average total
revenues of $6 million for the last three years is replaced with a revenue
requirement of at least $5 million for each of the last three fiscal years.
The purpose of this change is to ensure that an issuer relying on this ex-
emption has had minimal amounts of total revenue in each of its last three
fiscal years.3 06 Under the penny stock test, a higher dollar threshold is
used-$6 million as opposed to $5 million-and average revenues of the
last three years are the focus. Averaging, however, might allow an issuer
with sizable revenues in its first year but declining revenues in the next
two years to pass the test. The Standard, by contrast, requires revenues of
at least $5 million in each of an issuer's last three fiscal years. After all,
consistent revenues are the hallmark of a seasoned company.
The issuer financial statements necessary to demonstrate achievement
of either financial milestone are discussed in paragraph (b)(1) of the Stan-
dard. Similar to the requirement in the "penny stock" definition,30 7 finan-
cial statements---either audited or unaudited-must be dated less than fif-
teen months prior to the date of the proposed sale of securities. If,
however, an issuer has audited financial statements that are dated less than
fifteen months prior to the date of the proposed sale, then those financial
statements rather than any more recent unaudited financial statements must
be used to demonstrate achievement of either financial milestone.
Paragraph (a)'s second exemption relates to underwritten offerings.
As noted earlier, the greatest risk to investors confronted by self-managed
SIPOs arises from the lack of involvement by experienced and deep-
306. Any issuer that has been in business less than three years who seeks to take advantage of
the Standard's seasoned issuer exemption must qualify under the net tangible assets test of paragraph
(a)S)1A)(ii).
307. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.3a~l-l(g)(3).
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pocketed underwriters. 3°s Accordingly, only traditional underwritten of-
ferings conducted by qualified underwriters are specifically excluded from
the provisions of the Standard. Indeed, investors participating in those of-
ferings can benefit from the investment banking protections discussed ear-
lier.309 These include compliance by the underwriters with the NASD
Suitability Rule to the extent required and, depending on the particular of-
fering, the SEC Suitability Rule.
Paragraph (b)(2) provides an important gloss to the underwritten of-
fering exemption. It states that only those offerings that are underwritten
on a "firm commitment" basis by one or more "underwriters" are exempt.
Subparagraph (A) defines "firm commitment" offering as an "offering
with respect to which an issuer has contractually agreed in writing, subject
to usual and customary conditions, to sell the entire allotment of securities
offered to one or more securities firms, whether or not represented by one
or more managers, managing underwriters, or principal underwriters."
Subparagraph (B) defines "underwriter" as:
any person (i) qualifying as such under section 2(11) of the Securities
Act, (ii) having net tangible assets of $25 million or more at the time of
the offering, and (iii) having engaged in the underwriting of securities as
one of its primary businesses during the twelve months immediately pre-
ceding the offering.
The implications of paragraph (b)(2) are fourfold. First, offerings un-
derwritten on a "best efforts" basis310 or any other basis (other than a firm
commitment basis) are not excluded, because underwriters involved in
those offerings have little financial risk. Indeed, "[b]est efforts underwrit-
ing is generally used by less established issuers that cannot find an invest-
ment banker who is willing to make a firm commitment because of the
speculative nature of the distribution."311 Second, a firm commitment un-
derwriting is only "firm" if there is a contractual agreement between the
issuer and one or more underwriters. That agreement, however, may be
subject to usual and customary conditions, such as a "market out.
312
Third, an elaborate underwriting syndicate is not necessary so long as one
308. See supra Part II.A.
309. See supra Part II.A.
310. A "best efforts" underwritten offering is one in which an underwriter does not buy the se-
curities from the issuer outright, but rather attempts to use its "best efforts" to sell them as the issuer's
agent. See generally HAZEN, supra note 33, § 2.1, at 76.
311. Id. at 77.
312. These conditions would include such events as acts of war and other hostilities, and a mate-
rial adverse change affecting the issuer that materially impairs the investment quality of the offered
securities.
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or more underwriters have contractually agreed to purchase the entire al-
lotment of offered securities. Finally, the term "underwriter" is defined so
as to include only financially viable securities firms that are and have been
engaged in the underwriting of securities as one of their primary busi-
nesses.
Unlike the second exemption, Paragraph (a)'s third exemption relates
to the type of investor involved, rather than the type of offering. Specifi-
cally excluded from the protections of the Standard under paragraph
(a)(3)(A) are both institutions and natural persons qualifying as
"accredited investors" under Securities Act Rule 501(a). This differs from
both the NASD Suitability Rule and the SEC Suitability Rule. Under the
former rule, suitability determinations are required whenever a broker or
dealer makes a recommendation of any security to any customer. While
on its face the NASD Suitability Rule seems overly protective, it is de-
signed to cover the recommendation of both easily understood securities,
such as common stock, and complex securities, such as derivatives. 313 The
SEC Suitability Rule specifically excludes transactions with "institutional
accredited investors, as defined in Rule 501(a)(1), (2), (3), (7), or (8)(j-314
but leaves within its coverage natural persons who qualify for "accredited
investor" status under Rule 501(a)(5) and (6).
315
By contrast, the Standard excludes all "accredited investors" under
Rule 501(a) for the same reason those investors are not counted as
"purchasers" in Rule 505 and 506 offerings. That reason is that these in-
vestors can "fend for themselves" and thus do not need any additional
protection. It is presumed that, based on their financial success or other
factors, accredited investors are either financially sophisticated in their
own right or can afford to hire a financial adviser who is financially so-
phisticated.316 Because this presumption is sound, it has been reflected in
paragraph (a)(3)(A) of the Standard.
313. See generally Root, supra note 257.
314. 17 C.F.R. § 230.15g-l(b) (1998).
315. The SEC Suitability Standard does not specifically exclude individuals or entities qualify-
ing as accredited investors under Rule 501(a)(4), because it has a separate exclusionary provision that
is slightly broader than Rule 501(a)(4). Compare id. § 230.501(a)(4) (including within the definition
of accredited investor "[a]ny director, executive officer, or general partner of the issuer of the securi-
ties being offered or sold, or any director, executive officer, or general partner of a general partner of
that issuer"), with id. § 240.15g-l(d) (excluding "[t]ransactions in which the customer is the issuer, or
a director, officer, general partner, or direct or indirect beneficial owner of more than five percent of
any class of equity security of the issuer, of the penny stock that is the subject of the transaction").
316. But see Langevoort, supra note 26, at 22-23 (questioning the self-protective ability of ac-
credited investors who earned or received their wealth in ways not involving financial acumen).
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The third exemption of paragraph (a) also contains a provision ex-
cluding the direct or indirect beneficial owner of five percent or more of
the issuer's equity securities. Paragraph (a)(3)(B), which mirrors a similar
provision in the SEC Suitability Rule, is based on the notion that owners of
a significant percentage of an issuer's equity securities do not need the
protection of the Standard. Indeed, through their equity stakes, these own-
ers already have significant experience with the issuer in question and
likely have the leverage to effectively access financial information about
the issuer from its management.
317
Paragraph (a)'s fourth exemption is similar in many respects to para-
graph (a)(3)(B), as it too excludes investors with previous experience with
the securities of a particular issuer. Under the fourth exemption, any per-
son who has beneficially and continuously owned securities of the issuer
for more than one year is presumed not to need the protection of the Stan-
dard because of her prior experience with the issuer. There is one catch,
however. If the investor purchased those securities after the effective date
of the Standard as part of an offering exempt from registration pursuant to
section 3(b) of the Securities Act, then the issuer must have complied with
the requirements of the Standard in connection with the previous sale in
order for this exemptive provision to be available with respect to subse-
quent sales to that investor.
318
Assuming no other exemption is available, a SIPO issuer must com-
ply with the suitability provisions contained in paragraph (a)(5). This
means that, prior to selling securities to a given investor, the issuer must
determine that the type and amount of securities proposed to be sold to that
investor are suitable for the investor. The "amount" of securities is spe-
cifically included to help prevent an investor from purchasing too much of
what is perceived to be a good thing.319 Also, an issuer's determination
that a particular security is suitable for a given investor must only be
"reasonable," which means close calls favor the issuer.
An issuer must make its suitability determination "based on the in-
formation specified in paragraph (b)(3) of [the Standard] and any other in-
317. See Doran v. Petroleum Management Corp., 545 F.2d 893, 903 (5th Cir. 1977) (discussing
informational access in the context of the private placement exemption).
318. Of course, if the issuer relied on a section 3(b) exemption other than under Regulation A or
Rule 504 of Regulation D in connection with the previous offering, then the Standard's paragraph
(a)(4) exemption would not be available to that issuer with respect to subsequent sales.
319. Cf NASD MANUAL IM-2310-2(b)(5) (National Ass'n of Sec. Dealers, Inc. 1996) (noting
the unfairness of a broker "recommending the purchase of securities or the continuing purchase of
securities in amounts which are inconsistent with the reasonable expectation that the customer has the
financial ability to meet such commitment").
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formation about such person known by such issuer at or prior to the time
of sale." As seen below, the information specified in paragraph (b)(3)
must be set forth in a written statement. If, however, an issuer has gar-
nered any other information about a potential investor that is not included
in the written statement, the issuer must consider it as well. For example,
the issuer may have learned something about a potential investor pertinent
to suitability over the telephone during a sales call or via e-mail in re-
sponse to a test the waters solicitation. This also means that if an issuer
has had a preexisting relationship with a potential investor, the issuer can-
not ignore what it has learned about that investor based on the relationship.
Paragraph (b)(3) specifies that information about a potential investor
must be set forth in a written statement that the investor can then transmit
to the issuer in either paper or electronic form.320 This written statement,
however, may constitute a stand-alone document, such as an investor's
questionnaire, or be contained within another document, such as a sub-
scription agreement for the purchase of securities. This allows an issuer to
incorporate the necessary suitability-related questions within its existing
subscription documentation.
The specific information to be contained in the written statement is
designed to cover the three elements of suitability-namely an investor's
financial objectives, sophistication, and wherewithal. Paragraph (b)(3)(A)
covers the element of financial wherewithal. Information concerning an
investor's financial condition helps an issuer decide whether or not an in-
vestor can afford to lose her investment.321 If not, or if the investment
would represent too great a percentage of that investor's entire investment
portfolio, the issuer should decline to sell securities to that investor. Im-
portantly, an issuer can consider the financial condition of the investor
alone or the combined financial condition of that investor and her spouse,
if any.
Paragraph (b)(3)(B) of the Standard covers the element of financial
sophistication. In this regard, an investor may demonstrate that she alone
is sufficiently knowledgeable about financial and business matters that she
is capable of understanding the risks and rewards of the particular invest-
320. Cf. 17 C.F.R. § 240.15g-9(b)(3), (4) (requiring a broker or dealer to deliver a written state-
ment to a customer setting forth that broker's or dealer's suitability determination and requiring that
the customer sign it and return it).
321. This same information also assists an issuer in determining whether or not the investor is an
"accredited investor." If the investor is accredited, then the exemption under paragraph (a)(3)(A) of




ment. Alternatively, she can rely in whole or in part on the sophistication
of her purchaser representative, so long as that representative meets the
qualifications specified in Rule 501(h) of Regulation D.322 In order to de-
termine whether a particular investor and/or her purchaser representative
meets the requisite level of sophistication, an issuer should request infor-
mation concerning a person's educational and vocational history and in-
vestment experience.
Paragraph (b)(3)(C) of the Standard covers the final element of suit-
ability-namely, an investor's financial objectives. In this regard, an is-
suer could produce a simple grid ranging from capital preservation to ag-
gressive growth with corresponding boxes that an investor could simply
check to indicate her investment objectives. To further clarify this grid, an
issuer could include a notation indicating that capital preservation is the
"least risky" investment objective, while aggressive growth is the "most
risky." An issuer also should ask for an investor's age, because that in-
formation sheds light on how compatible a particular security is with an
investor's investment horizon. In this same vein, an issuer should ask an
investor when she anticipates converting her investment into cash.
Paragraph (c) of the Standard sets forth the consequences an issuer
faces if it sells securities to a particular investor in contravention of the
Standard. If the Standard requires the issuer to make a suitability determi-
nation and the issuer either fails to do so or makes one that is unreasonable
under the circumstances, then the issuer loses its exemption under section
3(b) of the Securities Act solely with respect to that particular sale. Ac-
cordingly, the issuer must find another exemption to cover that sale. The
availability of another exemption, however, is unlikely.
An issuer finding itself in this position cannot rely on Regulation A or
Rules 504 or 505 of Regulation D, because its section 3(b) exemption is
lost with respect to the violative sale by virtue of paragraph (c) of the
Standard. In addition, because the issuer most likely will have solicited
the general public or advertised its offering, an exemption under sections
4(2) and 4(6) of the Securities Act and Rule 506 of Regulation D also
would be unavailable.323 Similarly, an intrastate exemption under section
3(a)(11) of the Securities Act324 and Rule 147325 would be unavailable if
322. 17 C.F.R. § 230.501(h).
323. Under those circumstances, an exemption under Rule 505 of Regulation D also will not be
available; however, Rule 505, which was promulgated under the SEC's authority under section 3(b) of
the Securities Act, is already lost because of the unavailability of the section 3(b) exemption.
324. 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(1l) (1994 & Supp. III 1997).
325. 17 C.F.R. § 230.147.
1998]
SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW
the issuer solicited investors in multiple states via the Internet or other-
wise. Thus, a SIPO issuer most likely would not find another exemption to
cover a particular sale that violated the provisions of the Standard.
If the issuer cannot find another exemption and its securities are not
registered under section 5 of the Securities Act, the issuer will have vio-
lated section 12(a)(1) of the Securities Act solely with respect to the viola-
tive sale.326 Section 12(a)(1) states:
Any person who... [o]ffers or sells a security in violation of Section
5 ... shall be liable... to the person purchasing the security from him,
who may sue either at law or in equity in any court of competent juris-
diction, to recover the consideration paid for such security with interest
thereon, less the amount of any income received thereon, upon the ten-
der of such security, or for damages if he no longer owns the security.
In other words, the investor will have an automatic and immediately
available "put" right against the issuer. The investor will be able to force
the issuer to buy back that security from her for any reason whatsoever,
such as a realization that the security is truly illiquid or at the first hint of
trouble with the issuer's business. The only caveat will be that any action
must be brought by the investor within one year after the date the security
was sold to her or three years after the security was bona fide offered to the
public, whichever comes earlier.
327
Paragraph (c) also allows the SEC at any time to enter an order tem-
porarily or permanently suspending an issuer's section 3(b) exemption
with respect to an entire offering, as opposed to an isolated sale. This sus-
pension is warranted if the SEC has reason to believe that a particular is-
suer is systematically selling securities in contravention of the Standard.
Whether or not an issuer is doing so deliberately or unintentionally would
have no effect on the SEC's ability to suspend that issuer's section 3(b)
exemption. Unintentional sales of unsuitable securities harm investors just
as much as intentional sales.
3. Arguments Against the Proposed Standard
Three primary arguments have been raised against implementing a
federal suitability standard in the context of self-managed SIPOs. Not sur-
prisingly, the first argument stresses that the Standard, like any other
regulatory provision, would dampen the efficiency of the capital markets
because of increased transaction costs. Yet, where better to institute regu-
326. 15 U.S.C. § 771(a)(1) (Supp. III 1997).
327. See id. § 77m (1994).
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latory protections than with respect to the riskiest of issuers offering se-
curities to the most vulnerable of investors?
Moreover, those issuers that are the likely candidates to conduct self-
managed SIPOs already are required to make determinations similar to
those required by the Standard in the context of other exempt offerings.
For example, many SIPO issuer candidates currently raise capital under
either Rule 505 or 506 of Regulation D. Both rules require issuers to make
the necessary determinations to ensure that they sell securities to no more
than thirty-five "purchasers" and an unlimited number of "accredited in-
vestors." Rule 506 additionally requires issuers to ensure that
"purchasers" are sophisticated. Issuers relying on Rules 505 and 506,
therefore, already incur transaction costs substantially similar to those that
would be incurred if the Standard were implemented.
A second argument against the Standard is that certain SIPO issuers
may not be capable of making the suitability determinations required by
the Standard. As discussed above, however, SIPO issuer candidates al-
ready are making similar determinations in the context of exempt offerings
conducted under Rules 505 and 506. Moreover, any issuer that is savvy
enough to pull off a self-managed SIPO is sophisticated enough (in this
author's opinion) to make suitability determinations. To the extent an is-
suer truly feels uncomfortable making suitability determinations, it can
retain an outside consultant to perform that task for it.
Issuers also can substantially reduce the number of suitability deter-
minations they are required to make by simply imposing a minimum in-
vestment requirement. For example, an issuer could require a minimum
investment of at least $5,000 from each investor. Those investors unwill-
ing or unable to invest that minimum amount of capital would be excluded
from participating in the offering. This type of requirement could also
help keep securities out of the hands of the most vulnerable investors-
those with the least amount of money to invest (and lose).
A third argument relates to paragraph 3(c) of the Standard. That
paragraph gives an investor a limited "put" right to the extent that an issuer
has failed to make a suitability determination or has made an unreasonable
suitability determination with respect to that investor. As a result of that
"put" right, money would flow out of the issuer and into the hands of the
injured investor. The argument goes that this outflow of cash would hurt
the remaining investors, thus making them in effect bear the risk of issuer
noncompliance with the Standard. It is argued, moreover, that when an is-
suer's business takes a turn for the worse, it is patently unfair to allow
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some investors to salvage their investments at a time when others must
ride out the storm or even be swallowed by it.
In this regard, it is important to remember several things. First, the
largest recovery an injured investor can receive is his money back. Thus,
when viewed from this perspective, the net effect on the issuer is zero;
money that should never have been accepted by the issuer is simply being
returned by the issuer. Indeed, the "put" right is simply a recognition of
the fact that an injured investor should never have been an investor in the
first place. Second, those investors for whom a given investment was suit-
able are the ones that were able to "fend for themselves" upon receiving
full disclosure. Accordingly, once the Standard is implemented those in-
vestors should simply factor the risk of issuer noncompliance into their
decisionmaking calculus. If the risk of issuer noncompliance together with
all the other risks of a given self-managed SIPO makes that offering too
risky for a potential investor, that investor can simply choose to invest
elsewhere.
It also is important to recognize that requiring SIPO issuers to make
suitability determinations makes intuitive sense for the same reason that it
makes sense for the NASD to compel brokers to make those determina-
tions. Indeed, SIPO issuers' solicitations of random members of the public
over the Internet or e-mail closely resemble broker cold calls to potential
customers. These solicitations, therefore, are deserving of similar regula-
tion.
This resemblance to cold calls is manifested in at least four ways.
First, just as customers receiving cold calls must "rely ... extensively on
securities salesmen eager to confirm sales," 328 investors solicited by SIPO
issuers must place their trust in officers and other minions eager to raise
capital. Second, like cold-calling brokers picking random names from the
phone book, SIPO issuers often have no meaningful nexus to the members
of the public they solicit. Third, while cold-calling brokers stand to earn
commissions from their efforts, SIPO issuers stand to save on underwriting
commissions by directly placing their securities. Finally, like cold-calling
broker recommendations, SIPO issuers' unilateral solicitations of random
members of the public arguably constitute outright recommendations of
their securities to those members.
Accordingly, it makes sense to require unseasoned SIPO issuers to
make suitability determinations when making sales to unsophisticated re-
tail investors. Just as the NASD saw the potential for abuse when broker
328. Warren, supra note 183, at 137.
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recommendations are coupled with commission generation, the same po-
tential for abuse arises when commission savings are coupled with capital
generation in the context of self-managed SIPOs. The policy justifications
in both cases for requiring suitability determinations are substantially
similar.
C. OTHER MODIFICATIONS TO REGULATION A DESIGNED
TO PROTECr INVESTORS
In addition to adopting the Standard, the SEC should make two addi-
tional modifications to Regulation A in order to help protect investors.
First, Rule 253(d) should be modified to require issuers to add the follow-
ing legend to the cover page of their offering circulars:
THE SECURITIES OFFERED HEREBY ARE HIGHLY
SPECULATIVE AND INVOLVE A SUBSTANTIAL DEGREE OF
RISK. ACCORDINGLY, THE SECURITIES ARE SUITABLE ONLY
FOR PERSONS WHO CAN AFFORD A TOTAL LOSS OF THEIR
INVESTMENT.
This legend should be the first legend appearing on the cover page and
should take the form of a separate and distinct paragraph not combined
with any other legend.
While the necessity of this legend is obvious, Form 1-A does not nec-
essarily require anything like it. Form 1-A allows a corporate issuer to in-
clude in its offering circular information specified by Model A of Part II of
Form 1-A, Model B of Part II of Form 1-A, or Part I of Form SB-2 (except
for the financial statements called for therein).329 Model A of Part II of
Form 1-A requires that an issuer include a somewhat similar legend on the
cover page of its offering circular.330 However, Model B of Part II of
Form 1-A and Part I of Form SB-2 do not.331 A corporate issuer wishing
329. See Form l-A, Part II-Offering Circular; JENNINGS ET AL., FEDERAL SEcuRIIES LAWS, su-
pra note 35, at 358-83.
330. That legend reads in part: "INVESTMENT IN SMALL BUSINESSES INVOLVES A
HIGH DEGREE OF RISK, AND INVESTORS SHOULD NOT INVEST ANY FUNDS IN THIS OF-
FERING UNLESS THEY CAN AFFORD TO LOSE THEIR ENTIRE INVESTMENT." Form 1-A,
Part II-Offering Circular, Offering Circular Model A, Cover Page; JENNINGS ET AL., FEDERAL SE-
CURITIES LAWS, supra note 35, at 359.
331. Model B of Part II of Form I-A simply states the following: "The cover page of the offering
circular shall include the following information: ... (i) If applicable, identify material risks in con-
nection with the purchase of the securities." Form 1-A, Part II-Offering Circular, Offering Circular
Model B, Item 1 (i); JENNINGS Er AL., FEDERAL SECURITIES LAWS, supra note 35, at 375. Part I of
Form SB-2 only requires an issuer to "[c]ross-reference to, and identify the location within the pro-
spectus of (e.g., by page number or other specific location), the risk factors section of the prospectus
.... " Form SB-2, Part 1, Item I (referencing Regulation S-B, Item 501(a)(4)).
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to avoid the inclusion of Model A's legend could, therefore, simply choose
to follow one of the latter two options.
332
The second modification to Regulation A would be to require issuers
to include a history of their financing efforts within their offering circulars.
In this regard, the following types of questions would be answered. How
has an issuer financed its operations to date? Has the issuer approached
venture capital firms for financing? If so, what was the result? If venture
capital firms declined to provide financing, did they provide the issuer
with specific reason why? Similarly, has the issuer approached any in-
vestment banks to underwrite an offering? If so, what was the result? If
the investment banks declined to underwrite an offering by the issuer, did
they provide the issuer with specific reasons? The purpose of these ques-
tions is to inform potential investors that they could be the financing
source of last resort, since the issuer may have been shot down by all other
financing sources or intermediaries that it previously courted.33 3
CONCLUSION
The Internet and other electronic media now enable unseasoned busi-
nesses to directly and cost-effectively offer their securities to unpreferred
retail investors pursuant to the small issue offering exemptions of Regula-
tion A and Rule 504 of Regulation D. This development, however, raises
issues relating to how suitable these securities are for many of these inves-
tors. Because existing securities laws and suitability standards do not ad-
dress these issues, a new suitability standard needs to be fashioned and
implemented to safeguard these investors.
This Article proposes a new suitability standard applicable to unsea-
soned issuers who conduct self-managed SIPOs targeting unpreferred re-
tail investors. The standard is carefully tailored to ensure the proper chan-
332. See, e.g., SPRING STREET OFFERING CIRCULAR I, supra note 44, at Cover Page (no similar
legend); SPRING STREET OFFERING CIRCULAR II, supra note 44, at Cover Page (no similar legend). Cf.
Offering Circular of The Pathways Group, Inc., supra note 211, at Cover Page (including information
required by Part I of Form SB-2 and voluntarily incorporating the following legend on its cover page:
"The securities offered hereby involve a high degree of risk and should not be purchased by investors
who cannot afford the loss of their entire investment.").
333. For example, a typical disclosure in this regard could take the following hypothetical form:
On September 23, 1998, representatives of the issuer met with representatives of the invest-
ment banking firm of PaineWebber Incorporated. The purpose of the meeting was to gauge
PaineWebber's interest in underwriting on a firm commitment basis an offering of the is-
suer's common stock designed to raise $13 million in proceeds. The proceeds of the offer-
ing were earmarked for the repayment of debt and for capital expansion plans. However,
PaineWebber declined to participate in such an offering based on its view of the issuer's fu-
ture prospects, the issuer's lack of a track record in earnings growth, and the small size of
the proposed offering.
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neling of these issuers' securities into the portfolios of suitable investors
while minimizing the disruption to these issuers' capital-raising efforts.
Implementing this standard will both protect the most vulnerable segment
of the investing public and enhance the reputation of the Internet as a vi-
able means of capital formation.
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